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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a theoretical alternative to the present
sanity- insanity dichotomy. That alternative is labelled Supersanity
and it is presented within a multi-disciplinary approach. This multi-
disciplinary approach includes the traditional academic fields of
philosophy, theology, literature, and psychology.
The theory of Supersanity is initially developed within a phil-
osophical perspective. The philosophical foundations of current descrip-
tions of sanity-insanity are examined and found to be primarily episte-
mological. This is felt to be inadequate; therefore, a philosophical
foundation which is ontological, epistemological, and teleological is
developed for the theory of Supersanity.
Next, the theory of Supersanity is developed within a theologi-
cal perspective. Discussion of current descriptions of sanity—insanity
in terms of Apollonian or Dionysian behavior is presented, and these
descriptions are considered in theological, anthropological and psycho
logical frameworks. Argument is made for the superiority of the
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Dionysian perspective and Supersane behavior is described in Dionysian
terms
.
The paper next moves to a consideration of myth, appearance and
reality in descriptions of sanity-insanity. Again, current descriptions
of sanity-insanity are outlined and seen to reject the positive value of
personal myth, and to rely on perception of appearances. Argument is
made for Supersanity and possession of personal myth and apprehension
of reality.
Finally, the paper summarizes the theory of Supersanity and out-
lines implications of the theory for education and counseling methodolo-
gies.
vii
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You have everything Boss,
Except one thing
—
Madness
!
A man needs a little madness,
Else he dares never cut the rope
And be really free.
Zorba the Greek
x
PROLOGUE
The soul selects her own society.
Emily Dickinson
Because the various ideas contained within the theory of Super-
sanity are highly colored by my values, morals, beliefs, etc., the
theory of Supersanity is presented in an extremely academic and objec-
tive form. This is done in an attempt to counter-balance the subjec-
tive material contributing to the theory. However, it is also possible
that the academic form of the dissertation may mask the subjective ele-
ments; therefore, an attempt will be made to delineate them here.
It must be noted that the theory of Supersanity developed ini-
tially from subjective rather than objective material. Observations of
behavior began when only the subjective base existed and to some extent
academic materials were included which offered an objective validation
of the subjective material. Since this is the customary procedure in
the development of psychological theory, I feel no need to justify the
practice. Rather, I feel it important to outline the subjective biases
with which I began so that they may be kept in mind when reading the
dissertation.
The most obvious of my subjective biases, values, beliefs, etc.
is insistence on finite and non—finite dimensions to reality and man s
experience of that reality. This is a foundation for the theory of
Supersanity and is necessary to the development of the various points
in the theory. My insistence of finite and non-finite dimensions to
xi
reality and man's experience is part of my belief structure. That is,
I view my own experience as, at times, passing the bounds of the finite;
and I also believe that the world consists of more than what is apparent
to the senses. Also, in accord with human nature, I generalize my ex-
perience to all men; and since recognition of finite and non-finite di-
mensions is a recurring human experience, I am comfortable in my general-
ization.
Another subjective bias with which I began the observations
which lead to the theory of Supersanity is that man has the ability to
become more than he is and that human growth, by itself, will be positive.
This belief is reflected both in my own struggle for personal growth and
in the ways in which I view others engaged in similar processes. This
view, perhaps, also colors the discussion of positive teleology in Chapter
II. Assertion of a positive teleology is consistent with my view of hu-
man growth, although expanded to include universal becoming.
Other items of personal conviction may also be found in the vari-
ous chapters of the dissertation. Thus, my belief that our society often
forces individuals to act in ways that are not good can be seen in dis-
cussion of social norms. Or my belief that there is a higher good than
that presented by the social norms can be found in these discussions.
In fact, in the dissertation, discussion of any type of norma-
tive behavior may reflect my personal beliefs and political convictions
in this regard. On a political level, I view norms—or laws, customs,
etc.—as a process whereby individual human behavior may be controlled
or kept within certain boundaries. I believe that society disapproves
of, and seeks to eliminate, any extreme type of human behavior. Thus,
xii
the retardate and the genius, the sinner and the saint, the extremely
sick and the exceptionally healthy are all outside of, and contradictory
to, societal norms. I do not feel society asks, "Are these things best
for the individual or the society?" but instead asks, "How do we con-
trol these things?" Once this question is asked, the answer that it is
easiest to control things or persons which are similar becomes clear.
And control, I believe, is political. This belief, most probably, is
reflected in various ways in the dissertation.
There are, however, portions of the theory of Supersanity which
have contradicted some of my personal values, beliefs, morals, etc. The
Dionysian dissolution of individuality, for example, initially conflicted
with my view that man is a discreet individual uniquely responsible for
his actions. It was extremely difficult to reconcile this with the
Dionysian view of "unity with the universe." However, my subjective
values were in conflict with the theory I was developing. One or the
other had to change, or the theory had to be developed in a way that no
longer reflected my personal views. It was a difficult decision, but
my subjective values were reorganized to accommodate the obvious dic-
tates of the theory. I now believe that man is responsible for his ac-
tions and, if Dionysian, they reflect the positive teleology of the uni-
verse.
However, the situation is not totally resolved. The choice was
made in favor of the unity of the theory of Supersanity. This, I be-
lieve, demonstrates that the theory of Supersanity is other than a mere
reflection of my personal beliefs and values. Although these have played
a part in the development of the theory, the theory of Supersanity
has
maintained its unity and consistence in instances where conflicts
arose.
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myOf course, the academic or objective material also reflects
personal values, beliefs, etc. Thus, when a question arose over which
author to cite in reference to a point in the theory, preference was al-
ways given to "old friends." Sometimes special effort was made to in-
clude these "old friends" in the dissertation. Those individuals cited
in the body of the document who have special meaning to me include:
Plato, Pascal, Jung, Zeno of Elea, and Gilbert Murray.
This discussion should highlight the subjective elements in the
dissertation for the reader. If he keeps them in mind, the paper's value
should be enhanced. Also, I would like to define a few terms which are
used repeatedly in the text and which have slightly different meanings
for me than the common connotative or denotative ones.
Most important of these is the word myth . Within the body of
the text, myth is used in an extremely positive fashion. It connotes
expression of man's apprehension of non-finite reality or of ultimate
truth. It should not be viewed as containing falsity or fantasy. Al-
though it may not embody historical, scientific, or apparent fact, it
does embody man's accurate perception of finite and non-finite reality.
Another word which should also be defined for the reader is non-
finite reality . This is used to connote the spiritual dimension of man's
existence. It includes those aspects of knowing and being which are not
evident through sense perception but are apprehended none the less. Non-
finite reality is the foundation for finite reality and provides man with
his ability to transcend the finite.
It is, of course, artificial to separate reality into finite and
non-finite components. Both comprise Reality which encompasses all
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dimensions of being and knowing as well as the positive teleology of the
universe.
Also, it should be noted that the terms Apollonian and Dionysian
are given new values in this text. Unlike the common usage, Apollonian
is given negative connotations and Dionysian is given positive connota-
tions. This should be carefully noted by the reader.
Finally, I would like to discuss the limitations of the theory
of Supersanity. At present, it is just a hypothetical construct without
experimental validation. However, it does have the weight of considerable
academic documentation to add to its value. Also, it was developed along
the lines that most scientific or psychological theories develop. Obser-
vations in accord with the author's subjective view of the world were
made. There appeared to be direction or unity to these observations,
and thus a theory developed. This is the manner in which Freud and
Einstein developed their theories. And these theories were used to pre-
dict behavior of individuals or of matter long before experimental vali-
dation was possible. In fact, with Freud's theories, the only validation
that may be possible is the similar observations of others.
Thus, I would suggest that readers use the theory of Supersanity
as an alternative to the current view of sanity-insanity. If their ob-
servations confirm the theory of Supersanity, they may wish to begin to
consider the implications of this confirmation. If their observations
conflict with the theory, they do not necessarily have to give the theory
more thought.
However, I would caution those who find their observations con-
firming the theory of Supersanity not to discard their previously held
xv
beliefs regarding sanity and insanity. Instead, I would ask them to
proceed cautiously with continued observation and to act in accord
the theory of Supersanity only as parts of it become more and more
firmed in the reader’s mind.
xvi
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CHAPTER I
THE SANITY-INSANITY DICHOTOMY
AND THE THEORY OF SUPERSANITY
’T is education forms the common mind
Just as the twig is bent, the tree’s inclined
A. Pope
Society has, at present, two ways of describing or categorizing
behavior: they are sane/normal/adaptive or insane/abnormal/mal-adaptive.
In describing this dichotomy, Ruth Benedict (1934a) stated, "Abnormality
is culturally defined. It is primarily a term for that (behavior) that
a particular civilization does not use." More recently, Thomas Szasz
stated, "Whenever we try to give a definition of what mental health is,
we simply state our preference for a certain type of cultural, social
and ethical order (1956)."
However, regardless of how culturally biased or scientifically
unfounded the concept of sane/normal/adaptive behavior may be,'*' it is a
concept employed by society in the socialization process (Secord and
Backman, 1964) and by the schools as major contributors to that process
(Anderson, in Anderson, 1959). The particular conception of sane/normal/
adaptive behavior used in the socialization process is the social norm
which may be defined as "a standard or behavioral expectation which is
shared by group members against which the validity of perception and the
''"For further discussion of this point, see Kisker, 1964, Chapter
I. Five theoretical models of normality: the subjective, normative,,
cultural, statistical, and clinical are outlined along with a discussion
of the strengths and weaknesses of each.
2 .
appropriateness of feelings and behavior is evaluated (Secord and Backman,
1964)." Social norms include perceptual, cognitive and affective behavior
in addition to overt types of behavior. Thus, they become the measure of
correctness for the way an individual perceives, understands and feels in
any situation (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959).
That these social norms need not conform with what is considered
physical reality has been demonstrated by the well-known work of Sherif
(1935, 1948) and Asch (1956). These experiments deal with group pressure
versus individual perception. In these experiments, a group is asked to
estimate the length, height, etc. of some object. The majority of the
subjects are in the confidence of the experimenter and purposely mis-
judge the length, height, etc. of the object. The naive subjects in the
group gradually conform to group opinion, disregarding their perception
of reality. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that individuals who
have formed an experimental group opinion or "social norm" will respond
in terms of that norm when tested alone (Secord and Backman, 1964).
In addition, it has also been demonstrated (Thibaut and Kelley,
1959) that social norms developed outside the laboratory in society itself
do so "in a situation where individuals would not ordinarily adopt the be-
havior in question." This may be interpreted to mean that a particular
type of behavior is established as a social norm only when individuals
would not adopt it innately or as a matter of course. Monogamy, for
example, has become a social norm for mating behavior because individuals
do not automatically act monogamously . Also, negative normative behaviors
such as racism, can be seen as imposed on or developed in individuals
by
a process of societal pressure and modeling. There is nothing
in the
3 .
behavior patterns designated monogamy or racism which are other than
societally determined, and these behavior patterns may vary from society
to society, or from group to group. Speaking to this point, Peter L.
Berger and Thomas Luckmann write in The Social Construction of Reality
(1967,) p. 49):
Every culture has a distinctive sexual configuration, with its own
specialized patterns of sexual conduct and its own "anthropological"
assumptions in the sexual area. The empirical relativity of these
configurations, their immense variety and luxurious inventiveness,
indicate that they are the product of man's own socio—cultural for-
mations rather than of a biologically fixed human nature.
Just as what is considered a "social norm" is not biologically
innate, so what is considered to be sane/normal/adaptive is limited to
a particular society at a particular time. Columbus and W. H. Seward,
for example, are among the numerous individuals whose actions were judged
by a particular society at a particular time to be insane. Columbus'
assertion that the world was round and that you could reach the East by
sailing West, and Seward's purchase of what was seen as barren, unin-
habitable Alaska violated the prevailing norms of their eras. However,
later societal standards were able to justify the actions of these men
as sane and adaptive.
Thus, it may be seen that sane/normal/adaptive behavior, as in-
terpreted by societies in the social norm, is culturally determined
(Benedict, 1934a; Szasz, 1956); does not necessarily conform with physi-
cal reality (Sherif, 1935, 1948; Asch, 1956); is not the result of any
but sociologically established behavior patterns (Thibaut and Kelley
,
1959; Berger and Luckmann, 1967); and is temporally limited.
Of course, although we have dealt with some of the problems of
defining the sane/normal/adaptive, the same difficulties exist in
4 .
identifying the insane/abnormal/maladaptive. 2 Furthermore, in spite of
the existence of an either/or situation in which behavior is either sane
or insane, either normal or abnormal, either adaptive or maladaptive;
and despite the problems inherent in arriving at a satisfactory descrip-
tion of either sane/normal/adaptive or insane/abnormal/maladaptive be-
havior, educational institutions promote the continuance of this system:
therapeutic programs are designed according to this system; and individ-
uals are judged or classed according to this system.’
These criticisms are, of course, limited to psychological or
sociological descriptions of human behavior. However, similar criti-
cisms apply to a philosophical view of the problem of describing human
behavior in terms of sane/normal/adaptive or insane/abnormal/maladaptive.
Philosophy may be partially defined as the study of the nature of
man and his thought, and on an epistemological level, judgements, opin-
ions or norms concerning sanity/normality/adaptivity belong to that class
3
of thought considered as 6a£a (doxos) by Plato (Copleston, Volume 1,
1962). This is the lowest level of knowing in his epistemological simile
of the line (Republic, 509d-511e) and is not considered knowledge but
prejudice (Nettelship, 1898).
2
For further discussion of this point, see Kisker, Op. cit . Six
approaches to defining abnormality: the historical, descriptive, etio-
logical, diagnostic, therapeutic, and experimental are outlined along
with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each.
means opinion in a literal translation. However, it con-
notes opinion in the sense of prejudice or of seeing a particular ob-
ject without having a concept of the class to which it belongs (e.g.
,
seeing only John and not that John is a man, or of seeing only a novel
and not that it is fiction).
5 .
Therefore, in order to avoid prejudice in one’s views of the
sane/normal/adaptive, it is necessary to provide an alternative to
society's current limitations in describing behavior. Thus, this paper
proposes a specific alternative to the present sanity-insanity dichotomy.
The Alternative: Supersanity
The proposed alternative to the problem created by the existing
sanity- insanity dichotomy is a theoretical construct which I have come
to call Supersanity. Supersanity is, on one level, an observable pattern
of behavior: this segment of the construct evolved through several clin-
ical experiences.
I first became aware of the pattern of behaviors involved in this
construct while employed at the Brattleboro Retreat, a private mental
hospital in Vermont. A few of the patients with whoql worked were diag-
nosed as "insane" or "abnormal" but exhibited behaviors much different
from individuals who I then saw as "crazy." There was a type of aware-
ness, a kind of responsibility in their behavior which did not fit with
being "crazy." These individuals were cognizant of the loss of dignity
and responsibility that accompanies the label "insane." Furthermore,
they did not allow others to treat them without respect or consideration
as most of the patients did, nor did they ever learn to be "good patients"
and to do as they were told. Instead they seemed to act in accord with
an internal set of values. Needless to say, the hospital staff saw these
individuals as hostile or trouble-makers and attempted to help them "ad-
just to reality." After electroconvulsive therapy, psychoterapeutic
drugs, seclusion and the like, some made the adjustment, but it was a
long and bitter struggle.
6 .
I took the memory of those "not-crazy crazy people" with me when
I left the Retreat, but never gave any shape or structure to it. This
memory remained a sequence of disturbing but unexplained events until I
chanced to see the movie version of Catch 22
. Projected on the screen,
in the character of Yossarian, were those "not—crazy crazy" patterns
again. I became aware of the fact that if the society in which he were
depicted were to define Yossarian' s actions, they would be forced to see
him as insane because his actions were out of concert with the accepted
social norms. But by being outside the society and free from its norms,
I could see that Yossarian was the only sane individual in the situation.
And perhaps he was neither sane nor insane but something else; perhaps
there was another way to describe his behavior.
This was one spring for the theory of Supersanity and accounts
for those portions of the construct which deal with observable behavior
patterns. Included in this pattern is the ability to act consistently
with an internal value system. This is similar to the possession of an
"internal locus of evaluation" postulated by Carl Rogers (in Anderson,
1959) and to the "sense of I as the originator of my acts" described
by Eric Fromm (in Anderson, 1959). Supersane individuals, unlike those
who participated in Sherif's (1935, 1948) and Asch's (1956) experiments,
will tend to give primary consideration to their personal perception of
reality and will act consistently with their perceptions regardless of
group or societal pressure.
Supersane individuals will also tend to distinguish between the
appearance and reality of a given situation. They seem to have the
ability to look behind, under or around the apparent situation to
find
7 .
"what's happening." In Yossarian's situation, they would be able to see
that war is not fought for freedom and dignity but to satisfy the egotis-
tical and materialistic desires of the elite. This ability to look be-
hind appearance to the reality of a situation is similar to Neitzsche’s
description of the Dionysian experience (1956)
.
Supersane individuals, from my clinical experience, possess two
other distinguishing characteristics. One is the ability to act respon-
sibly and intentionally rather than allow abberation or circumstance to
justify their actions. Like Sartre (1947b), they see "we have no excuse
behind us and no justification before us." They are the originators of
and ultimately responsible for their actions. Supersane individuals
also possess personal myths that allow them to define reality and work
towards or in it. They seem able to say, "I am a good and kind person,"
or "I have been chosen to do X thing" and then to act in such a way that
their personal myth becomes reality.
However, in addition to being an observable pattern of behavior,
Supersanity is also an ontological-epistemological-teleological descrip-
tion of the nature of man and, as such, developed from another direction.
As I became aware of the problems in an either/or definition of sane/
insane, normal/ abnormal, adaptive/maladaptive, I also became aware of
the problems of describing human behavior from the perspective of any
one academic discipline. A description of any facet of human behavior
must, first of all, be multi-disciplinary.^ This was the second spring
of the theory of Supersanity.
^Multi-disciplinary is used here instead of Inter-disciplinary
to connote the drawing of material from a variety of often seemingly
unrelated, academic disciplines. Inter-disciplinary connotes the draw-
ing of materials from somewhat related academic fields such as psychol-
ogy and anthropology.
8 .
The problems Inherent in defining sane/normal/adaptive by the
use of the social norm could perhaps be overcome if one were to deal
with the axiological or ethical issues involved. In addition, I also
became aware of the problems inherent in describing human behavior or
the nature of man from an exclusively epistemological perspective. The
who, the how and the why are dimensions which must be considered in
describing human behavior or the nature of man. Sanity/ insanity are
extensions of Aristotelian categories and are, therefore, strictly epis-
temological constructs (Copelston, Volume 1, 1964). They deal with only
the question of how man acts; man acts either in accord with or against
the social norm! They do not deal with the nature of the actor— the
who or ontological consideration—nor do they deal with the purpose of
the action— they why or teleological consideration.
Thus, I concluded that any adequate attempt at describing human
behavior must do so from a multi-disciplinary perspective and deal with
ontological and teleological, as well as epistemological considerations.
It must also free itself from strict adherence to the prevailing social
norms and consider man from within the above philosophical guidelines.
CHAPTER II
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS
OF THE THEORY OF SUPERSANITY
The heart has its reasons
Which reasons cannot know.
Pascal
Sanity or normality is, at present, viewed as being partially
defined as the logical functioning of the human mind. That is, for be-
havior to be viewed as sane/normal/adaptive, an individual must be able
to think in sequential, temporally-limited ways; to be able to move from
step 1 through steps 2, 3, 4, etc. to a warranted conclusion or solu-
tion. ^ For example, to illustrate the inability of the psychotic to
think in logical ways, Kisker (1964, p. 337) presents the following
conversation:
Q: What day is it?
A: According to my brain, it is two weeks from tomorrow.
Q: What time of day is it?
A: It's sub-noon in Egypt.
Q: How old are you?
A: Diagram.
Q: What city is this?
A: I am out of my brain today. City in mind.
You’re not getting any more sense out of me than out of a turnip.
~*Many psychological tests define normality as the ability to
solve problems in logical ways. Prime examples of this type of test
are the WAIS and WISC (1948, 1953) which allow full score only for
logical answers on sub-tests such as comprehension or similies.
Rorschach (1942) also has a bias for logical answers as may be seen
in categories such as "organization of response" or "determinants of
response.
"
10 .
Kisker follows this example by saying, "The surprising flash of insight
and rationality shown by the patient's last remark is not uncommon in
the psychosis." What Kisker wishes to show as abnormal is the lack of
the ability to demonstrate logical sequence in reaching conclusions or
insights. His definition of abnormality in this case refers to the
process by which the insight is reached and does not refer to the qual-
ity of the insight which is considered valid. The process by which the
patient achieved insight into the fact that he was not "making sense"
was not logical. However, the insight, in itself, was totally rational;
that is, it seemed a valid statement in accord with both the patient's
and the doctor's perception of reality. And since both the patient and
the doctor agreed on the validity of the perception, we must conclude
that it was an accurate description of the circumstances. But it is
also evidence of psychosis because of its lack of logicalness.
Thus, a division between reason and logic can be seen to exist
in current descriptions of man and sanity. This division focuses on
the how of human knowing and forms part of the philosophical base for
these descriptions. However, it is inadequate as a description of the
nature of man and sanity in that it is primarily epistemological and
limited to describing only those aspects of human behavior related to
the process of knowing.
A more adequate philosophical base from which to develop a
description of man and sanity begins with ontology. Ontology logically
precedes epistemology; the nature of being must be defined before the
limits of knowledge or the processes of knowing can be defined (Plato,
1942; Descartes, 1927). Thus, the theory of Supersanity will begin
11 .
with an ontological definition of man and moves from there to epistemo-
logical and teleological considerations.
Ontological Considerations
Ontology may be defined as "that branch of metaphysics which has
to do with ultimate reality or being (Titus, 1959, p. 486)." Ontology
has often been related to theology, and ultimate reality has often been
defined as God or Supreme Being (Tillich, 1958).
However, in accord with Copelston’s outline of the perenniel con-
cerns and diverging points of philosophical systems (1962, Volume 1),
we will limit consideration of ontology to the who or being in relation-
ship to man. Within this limit, man will be defined as a rational rather
than a logical being, possessing both finite (bodily) and non-finite
(spiritual) dimensions (Baker, 1947; Cassirer, 1953). Thus, the being
of man is able to contact, if not necessarily interpret, both finite and
non-finite dimensions of his environment (Sinnott, 1955; Neibuhr, 1941).
The rationality of man will be viewed in Platonic terms (Copelston,
1962, Volume 1). That is, it will be viewed in terms similar to those
used by Plato in the Phaedo (1942) where reason is described as the
highest function of the soul and destined to rule or govern the body.
Plato sees reason as independent and immortal in its essential nature.
According to this view (and it is mine), man is to be understood pri-
marily from the nature and uniqueness of his rational powers. Mind is
the unifying and organizing principle of human nature (Baker, 1947;
Sinnott, 1955; Perry, 1956). The goal of human effort and progress is
the harmonious development of all of man’s functions and capabilities
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through the superiority and perfection of reason in man and in his soci-
ety (Baker, 1947; Perry, 1956).
A more modern expression of this view of man is offered by
Reinhold Neibuhr (1941, p. 270) who writes:
To the essential nature of man belong, on one hand, all his natural
endowments and determinants
,
his physical and social impulses, his
sexual and racial differentiation, in short, his character as a
creature embedded in the natural order. On the other hand, his es-
sential nature includes the freedom of his spirit, his transcendence
over natural process, and finally his self— transcendence.
Thus, in the ontological foundation of the theory of Supersanity, man is
seen as part of, and superior to, the natural order. He has the ability
to use his rational powers to both order and transcend the natural.
Also, there is something permanent in his experience of self in relation-
ship to the world, and this permanence is linked with his rational abil-
ities .
From this description of being in relationship to man, we pro-
ceed to a description of how man utilizes his rational powers.
Epistemological Considerations
Epistemology may be defined as "that branch of philosophy which
studies the source, nature and validity of knowledge (Titus, 1959, p.
482)." There are numerous traditional problems and questions associated
with this branch of philosophy (Montague, 1925), and because of the pos-
sible breadth of epistemological considerations, philosophers such as
Carles Pierce and John Dewey (Konvitz and Kennedy, 1960) have held that
epistemology is the only productive branch of philosophy.
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However, for our purposes we will consider epistemology as fol-
lowing from the ontological considerations outlined above, or as know-
ledge defined and limited by the being who knows.
Thus, when considering the epistemological question of the
sources of knowledge, we must consider the ability of man to experience
in both finite and non—finite dimensions. Those current psychological
theories which are Empirical and focus on sense—perception as the pri—
mary source of knowledge, or are Rationalistic and focus on thinking as
the primary source of knowledge, or are a combination of sense percep-
gtion and thinking are inadequate in that they limit the sources of
knowledge and do not allow for knowledge from the non-finite area de-
fined in our ontological foundation.
For the theory of Supersanity, the sources of knowledge will be
held to include: (a) sense perception; (b) thinking processes; (c) in-
sight and intuition (Montague, 1925), but it must be understood that
Examples of this type of theory may be found among the adher-
ents of the various "stimulus-response" theories. With Pavlovian con-
ditioning (Pavlov, 1957)
,
the connection between physical perceptions
and learning/conditioning/knowledge is clear. In the less apparent
connections of Skinnerian behaviorism (Skinner, 1953), the physical
experience of food/approval/attention/etc. also results in learning/
knowledge/ conditioning.
^Pure examples of the Rationalistic school are rare in psychol-
ogy. However, Freud's conceptions of the primary process and Id (1916)
and Adler's theories including the drive of aggression (1908) are exam-
ples of thinking process controlling behavior without necessary refer-
ence to sense perception.
^The best example of a theory combining sense-perception and
thinking process is Gestalt psychology (Koffka, 1935; Koheler, 1938).
This theory uses sense data and mind as organizer to create knowledge/
learning. Concepts such as the closure factor (Wertheimer, 1945) illus
trate thought process altering and transforming sense perception.
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these sources encompass both the finite and non-finite dimensions of hu-
man experience; are not necessarily "observable" in the scientific sense;
but are capable of being ordered by man’s rational powers (Rhine, 1937).
The sources of knowledge, of necessity, encompass more types of
higher thought processes than mere logic. Plato, as mentioned above,
uses the term reason to denote all of man’s higher thought processes
which result in knowledge (Republic, 1942). In addition to the sequen-
tial or syllogistic pattern called logic (Montague, 1925), there are
various other thought or rational processes acceptable as sources of
knowledge within the epistemological considerations of the theory of
Supersanity. These include intuition or "the direct apprehension of
knowing which is not necessarily the result of conscious reasoning or
of immediate sense perception (Titus, 1959, p. 43)."
According to Henri Bergson (1911)
,
intuition is inward and im-
mediate, and can give us insight into the vital impulses of the world,
the elan vital. He distinguishes this from intelligence (logic) which
deals with matter and quantitative relations and which is incapable of
dealing with the nature of life or its duration. Intelligence (logic)
must describe living things in static terms, while intuition is free of
relationships with matter or the finite and, thus, able to transcend
both.
Also acceptable to the theory of Supersanity are such divergent
9
forms of thinking as hypnogogic and hypnopompic imagery, a priori or
9Hypnogogic and hypnopompic imagery occur just before sleep and
just before waking. They are transition states between sleep and wake-
fulness and allow the individual to experience sub-conscious material
directly rather than through the transformations of dream-work (McKellar,
1957).
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knowledge not related to experience, and various other forms of thought
such as dream-work or serial thinking (Brunner, 1957; McKellar, 1957).
AH these have led to advances in science, psychology or literature.
For example, the benzene ring was discovered as the result or dream-
work; Wertheimer formulated the original Gestalt psychological position
after having been partially hypnotized by listening to the monotonous
sound of train wheels; and Coolerige wrote Kubla Kahn in a semi-dream
state once he was totally awake, he lost the poem and was never able
to complete it (Koestler, 1964).
Any thought process capable of increasing the store of human art,
knowledge or science is acceptable to the theory of Supersanity. Indeed,
one of the characteristics of this behavior pattern may be the ability to
use varied and divergent thought processes to transcend the limits im-
posed by logic.
Epistemological questions related to the nature of knowledge or
of Appearance versus Reality (Titus, 1959) will be delayed until Chapter
IV. However, epistemological considerations related to the validity of
knowledge will be here considered.
Of the three traditional tests of truth—correspondence, consis-
tency and utility (Murphy, 1943)—no one is acceptable as sufficient to
the theory of Supersanity. Modifications are necessary for these tradi-
tional tests to be acceptable foundations for the epistemology of the
theory of Supersanity.
For example, correspondence theory states that truth is that
which conforms to fact or agrees with the actual situation or is fi-
delity to objective reality (Titus, 1959, p. 64)." Correspondence
16 .
theory, in so far as it depends only on sense data for information con-
cerning the finite, is inadequate because, as stated above, man is cap-
able of both finite and non-finite awareness, and correspondence theory
must, of necessity, deal with only one of these dimensions— the finite.
Coherence theory, as the second traditional test of truth, de-
scribes truth as that which is consistent with other judgements known or
accepted as true. Coherence theory demands an inner or formal consis-
tency within the systems under consideration and is separate from any
interpretation of the universe as a whole (Murphy, 1943). Again, co-
herence theory is limited in that its emphasis on logic and formal con-
sistency does not agree with insistence on, or acceptance of, reason and
varied higher through processes within the process of knowing. It is,
however, more adequate than correspondence theory in that it allows per-
sonal references to be used as determinants of truth and affords possi-
bility for dealing with both finite and non-finite dimensions. Its chief
defects are the limitations of logic, and that it deals with only some
aspects of man's apprehension of the finite and non-finite universe.
The final test of truth to be considered is pragmatic theory.
As stated by John Dewey (1920, pp. 156-157), an idea, theory or hypothe-
sis is true: (1) if it can be experimentally verified as true; (2) if
it satisfies the desires or purposes of men; and (3) if it aides in the
biological struggle for existence.
Pragmatic theory, by itself, is inadequate as a test of truth
for the theory of Supersanity in that it also is limited to the finite
aspects of man's apprehension by insistence on scientific verification
and enhancement of only the biological struggle. As Rhine (1937) has
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demonstrated, there are dimensions of man's experience beyond the range
of experimentation and biology but certainly not beyond truth.
As has been seen, the three traditional tests of truth are in-
dividually inadequate as epistemological foundations for the theory of
Supersanity. However, aspects of each, in combination, are capable of
providing this base. Thus, truth for the theory of Supersanity is that
which corresponds to both finite and non-finite reality. This correspon-
dence can not necessarily be determined by sense perception. Truth is
also that which is consistent with individual patterns of belief and
commitment whether or not those beliefs form a logical or consistent
system. Truth, for the theory of Supersanity, is finally that which
satisfies or enhances both the finite (bodily or biological) and the
non-finite (spiritual) purposes of men.
From this description of the process of knowing and the limits
of knowledge in relationship to the being who knows, we will proceed to
a discussion of the teleological considerations within the theory of
Supersanity.
Teleological Considerations
Teleology may be defined as "the theory of ends and purposes;
the doctrine that there is a design or purpose operating through the
structure of the universe (Titus, 1959, p. 490)." Teleology argues that
the order and progress in the universe discloses an immanent intelligence
and purpose. Like ontology, teleology and teleological purpose or de-
sign have been traditionally linked to a belief in God. However, in
considering teleology, we will again focus on man, on his relationship
18
.
to the design and purpose of the universe; for Supersanity is a theory
describing the nature of man and sanity.
The relationship of man to the design and purpose of the universe
has been well described by Walter R. Matthews in The Purpose of God
(1936, p. 127) where he writes:
When we dwell upon one aspect of the universe alone— the physical
in abstraction from the mental and spiritual—man may appear dwarfed
and insignificant in comparison with the stupendous frame of things;
but when we refuse to be deceived by this abstraction and unite the
two aspects, we are compelled, as I believe, to form a different es-
timate. Man, who knows and values and appreciates, is no alien in
the universe. He is the revelation of its nature. In him, the uni-
verse discloses itself in its real inner being—not as dead system
but as living Spirit.
For the theory of Supersanity, the nature of the universe in re-
lationship to man is purposeful. This purpose or design is the comple-
tion and fulfillment of all of man’s capabilities and functions in a
positive manner.^ Within the theory of Supersanity, the fact that man
has the potential for transcending nature and self (Neibuhr, 1941) is
of utmost concern. Since the theory of Supersanity aims at a more ade-
quate description of man and sanity, it must, of necessity, deal with a
positive teleology. Thus, concepts such as the ability and drive to
individuate and integrate various knowing processes (thinking, feeling,
sensing, intuiting) described in the psychology of C. G. Jung (1933) is
the type of teleological statement necessary for the theory of Supersan-
ity.
10
It must be recognized that the psychological concepts such
as the "death instinct (Freud, 1933)" are not teleological in that
they deal not with fulfillment of the total being (physical and spir-
itual) but only with biological inevitability.
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The teleological position of the theory of Supersanity is:
1. That the design of the universe in relationship to man is for
physical and psychological health and wholeness (Rogers, 1961;
Mas low, 1951).
2. That man contains within himself the ability to achieve this
health and wholeness (Rogers, 1961; Jung, 1969; Neibuhr, 1941).
3. That individual abberations are not part of the universal de-
sign or purpose (Sinnott, 1955; Rogers, in Koch, 1959).
4. That the drive toward individual fulfillment of capabilities
encompasses more than the biological level (Rhine, 1937; May,
19 70; Maslow, 1951).
This teleological position implies that individual development
is naturally proceeding toward the development of health and wholeness.
Only external factors
,
such as the environment or other men or person-
al choice, prevent individuals from attaining wholeness of both body
and spirit (Maslow, 1951). This position also implies that there is a
universal force or tendency guiding all men to become whole. This force
or tendency exists within all men and may be variously called "self-
actualization" (Maslow, in Anderson, 1958), "individualization of the
self" (Jung, 19 33), or "unity with the universal" (Neitzsche, 1956).
However, regardless of its name, man possesses this tendency to become
a whole, healthy individual.
The teleological position of the theory of Supersanity is, fur-
ther, that the universe as a whole is designed to promote the development
of wholeness in men. Individual abberations occur either because man
chooses to act in ways contradictary to this purpose or because man
chooses to fulfill himself on only one of the finite or non-finite
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levels. External factors may also circumvent the teleology of whole-
ness. Nonetheless, the theory of Supersanity holds that it is always
present, guiding the individual toward itself, toward becoming whole
and healthy in body and in mind.
This concludes our discussion of the philosophical foundations
of the theory of Supersanity. From here, we will move to a discussion
of characteristics of Supersane individuals which are related to the
above discussion.
The Implications of the Dichotomy Between Reason
And Logic for the Theory of Supersanity
As discussed above, sanity is, at present, being partially de-
fined and described as the ability to think in logical ways. And as
pointed out by the example from Kisker's The Disorganized Personality
(1964)
,
insight or the correctness of a problem solution is not as im-
portant to current definitions of sanity as the process of achieving
the solution. What makes a psychotic psychotic is not the inability to
achieve insight or solve problems but the inability to do so in a logi-
cal fashion.
Historically, logic has been held in high regard, and as also
previously discussed, forms part of the coherence theory of truth
(Murphy, 1943). There have been, however, several well-known challenges
to the validity of logic as a test of truth. Perhaps the earliest and
most revealing of these challenges was that of Zeno of Elea to the math-
ematical and philosophical system of the Pythagoreans (Copelston, Volume
I, 1962).
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Zeno of Elea, born about 489 B.C., was a disciple of Paramenidies
.
Paramenidies taught that change and motion were illusion, and since
change and motion are evident from sense perception, his position was
ridiculed. Zeno endeavored to demonstrate that Paramenidies was by no
means ridiculous by taking the Pythagorean theorums
,
and by the use of
logic, carrying them to their absurd conclusions. For example, Zeno
writes (Copelston, Volume 1, 1962, pp. 73-74):
Suppose a moving arrow. According to the Pythagorean theory, the
arrow should occupy a given position in space. But to occupy a
given position in space is to be at rest. Therefore, the flying
arrow is a rest, which is a contradiction.
or,
Let us suppose that you want to cross a stadium or race—course.
In order to do so, you would have to traverse an infinite number
of points. . . on the Pythagorean hypothesis.
. . . You would
have to travel the distance in finite time if you wanted to get
to the other side at all. But how can you traverse an infinite
number of points, and so an infinite distance, in a finite time?
We must conclude that you cannot cross the stadium. . . . The
same difficulty always recurs and all motion is consequently im-
possible
.
In the first example, Zeno’s use of syllogistic logic is clear.
With minor changes in order, the second example can also be seen as a
syllogism. It is also evident that there is no fault in the logic of
either example; however, the conclusions are absurd, and it is the fact
of obtaining absurd conclusions from correct logical processing that
makes Zeno of Elea of interest to the theory of Supersanity.
While his aim was to demonstrate the absurdity of the Pythagorean
philosophical system and to support that of Paramenidies, Zeno of Elea
demonstrated for all time that using "correct" process does not neces-
sarily lead to "correct" solutions. Indeed, solutions thus obtained
are often absurd, and Zeno’s method of attacking Pythagorean theory
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demonstrates the necessity of considering both process and conclusion
when evaluating the outcomes of man's thought processes.
For the theory of Supersanity, reason rather than logic is the
accepted mode for thought process, and as stated above, all the various
types of thought processes available to a man are encompassed by reason.
One of the characteristics of the Supersane individual is the ability
to move freely between the various thought processes available to him
and to integrate reason and emotion in solving problems or acting in
life situations. This means that the Supersane individual is not so
tied to logical or conscious thought patterns that he must use them ex-
clusively. He is able to utilize all the resources of his conscious
and unconscious mind, to be illogical, or to be logical. This experi-
ence in Supersane individuals is similar to that of self-actualizing
people described by Abraham Maslow (in Anderson, 1959). Maslow holds
that self-actualizing individuals have greater access to subconscious
material and are more able to use the primary process for acting in life
situations. And, he further holds that self-actualizing individuals are
also extremely healthy individuals.
The Supersane individual is also able to integrate reason and
emotion in problem-solving or daily action. Speaking to this point,
Kahlil Gilbran in The Prophet (1958) writes:
Your Reason and Passion
Are the Rudder and Sails
Of Your sea-faring Soul.
If either your Sails or your Rudder
Be broken,
You can but toss and drift, or else
Be held at a standstill
In mid-seas, t
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The integration of reason and emotion in thought processes and
problems solutions or conclusions may appear, to individuals tied to
societal standards of judging behavior, as insane. However, when seen
from the point of view of the individuals dealing with the problems these
solutions or conclusions are entirely rational, if not logical. In
Catch 22 (Heller, 19 70, p. 17), Yossarian illustrates this in an exchange
with his comrades.
You re crazy!. . . I'm not joking," Clevinger persisted.
"They're trying to kill me," Yossarian told him calmly.
"No one's trying to kill you," Clevinger cried.
"Then why are they shooting at me?" Yossarian asked.
"They're shooting at everyone ," Clevinger answered.
"And what difference does that make?".
. .
"Who's they?" he (Clevinger) wanted to know. "Who specifically, do
you think is trying to murder you?"
"Everyone of them," Yossarian told him.
"Everyone of whom?"
"Everyone of whom do you think?"
"I haven't any idea."
"Then how do you know they aren't?"
The above conversation can be judged in two ways; the first would be
from the prevailing clinical perspective, and Yossarian would be seen
as possessing classical symptoms of paranoia— feelings of persecution,
refering all ideas or actions to the self, etc. (Maslow and Mittelmann,
1951)— ; the second would be from the point of view of Supersanity
where Yossarian's statements could be judged as contributing to his
quest for survival
—
people were shooting at him and, therefore, his
statements are true on one level (Dewey, 1920). Also, seen in the con-
text of the total situation, Yossarian's absurd statements, quoted above,
are true and are born out by later events. Everyone— the Germans, his
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friends, his officers, Natley's whore— is trying to kill or destroy him.
So his seemingly insane response to Clevinger's questions may be seen as
representing responses including his intuition of the total situation
rather than only that portion of Yossarian's experience specifically be-
ing discussed with Clevinger. It is true that some of the events neces-
sary for a view of the total situation are future occurences, but as dis-
cussed above, man is capable of awareness of both finite and non-finite
dimensions (Baker, 1947; Cassirer, 1953). If Yossarian's present appre-
hension of a situation corresponds to the future actuality is it not true
or correct, if illogical? Also, if Yossarian reasons consistently with
his emotional apprehension of a given situation is this not coherent and,
thus, true?
As a Supersane individual, Yossarian is able to integrate his rea-
son (which tells him that people die if they are shot at in planes for a
long enough time) with his emotion (which tells him he does not want to
die) to get himself out of flying any more missions. Judged by the norms
of his society, Yossarian is a coward for doing this. He also displays
behavior that some would consider as "out of touch with reality." And
he is "out of touch" with the reality others around him exist in, but to
Yossarian, the war is not being fought to save the world from Fascism but
for the gain of a few. He sees himself as a pawn in situation where re-
ality does not correspond to the appearance that everyone agrees upon.
Yossarian acts upon his perception of reality , on what his reason and
emotions convey to him. And he acts in a way that is neither sane nor
insane but something else. He displays behavior characteristic of the
Supersane.
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Another example of a Supersane individual who integrates reason
and emotion in solving problems or reaching conclusions about events
surrounding her is The Countess Aurelia in Jean Giradoux’s play, The
Madwoman of Chaillott (1958). In this play, The Countess Aurelia is
faced with reaching a decision about exterminating a group of men out
to destroy Paris with their greed. And she exterminates these men with
so little compassion and with so few misgivings once her decision is
made that she appears also to be demented. She displays the "lack of
emotional response, or sense of guilt" characteristic of the sociopathic
personality (Maslow and Mittlemann, 1951). She acts "as if she did not
sense that she was doing wrong."
In classifying The Countess as insane, current theory would not
consider the fact that she was acting consistently with her beliefs.
She would be considered insane because she violated societal standards
which approve of greed and economic destruction of others. It would
not help that The Countess was aiding in both the biological and moral
struggle for existence. She would be insane!
But the theory of Supersanity has another way of describing her
actions. The Countess believed the world to be a place where greed and
insensitivity to the needs of others are out of place. Reasoning in ac-
cord with her emotional reactions to the situation threatening Paris,
she is able to overcome the powerlessness felt by her friends and to
eliminate the threat to her beloved city. To do so, it is necessary
for her to integrate her reason and emotion. Alone, neither would suf-
fice; reason alone would tell her she would be unable to overcome the
power of The President and The Prospector. Emotion alone would have
opened feelings of guilt and anger, but also of helplessness and
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hopelessness. She would not have been able "to save The World." Char-
acters such as Pierre and Irma, who are primarily reasonable, or Mmes
.
Constance and Josephine, who are only emotional, are unable to solve the
problem. Only The Countess, with her ability to integrate reason and
emotion, can develop a way to save Paris and The World.
Of course. The Countess does not destroy the individuals threat-
ening Paris without compassion. She gives them a fair trial and then
lets their own greed condemn them. She only allows this to happen. But
it is the allowing of the event that saves the situation. And in her
actions, the Madwoman saves the very things that society believes it is
protecting. The Countess, like Yossarian, is neither sane nor insane;
she is something else; she is Supersane.
The characteristic of including both reason and emotion in prob-
lem-solving or conclusion reaching gives the Supersane individual the
power to transcend mere logic by allowing emotional apprehension of both
finite and non-finite dimensions to be paired with various types of
thought processes, thereby increasing the scope and force of any solution
or conclusion by drawing on more aspects of man's being. The Supersane
individual seems able to tap the varied thought processes and emotional
experiences at his disposal. He is also able to free himself from the
logical norms of society and use his reason and emotion as a guide for
his actions. This combining of reason and emotion creates a new or dif-
ferent thought pattern than that found in the insane where emotion reigns,
or in the sane where reason is the order of the day.
CHAPTER III
THE THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THE THEORY OF SUPERSANITY
"Understand your station as man;
do as the Father tells you;
and you will be safe tomorrow,"
says Apollo.
"Forget the difference, and you
will find the identity, and you
will be happy today," says
Dionysus
.
E. R. Dodds
Current psychological theories dealing with sanity and insanity
make no claim to a theological base.
^
The belief or non-belief in a
deity or particular religious system is of no importance unless belief
becomes a symptom of disorder, such as the paranoid schizophrenic who
believes himself to be Jesus Christ.
There is, however, an aspect of theology (or theosophy, if you
will) which is related to both current psychological theory and the
theory of Supersanity and is necessary to an adequate description of
the nature of man as well. This aspect concerns man's apprehension
^This does not, of course, wholly apply to the various schools
of pastoral counseling, such as the "Personalism" of Peter Bertocci
(1957), current in Protestant semanaries. However, while they are
de
signed ’for use in religious settings, they draw heavily on other, tra-
ditional theories such as psychoanalysis, and cut across the
conflicting
dogmas of the various sects. Thus, their only theological
base is the
counselor who is usually a minister.
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of his separateness from, or his unity with, the divine or non-finite
aspects of his nature and being. Using the categories described by
E. R. Dodds in The Greeks and the Irrational (1971), man's awareness
of the distinction between himself and the divine or non-finite will
be considered Apollonian, and man's awareness of his unity with the
divine or non-finite will be considered Dionysian.
Apollonian Considerations
Within Dodd's framework, current psychological theories can be
seen as Apollonian in their description of sane /normal /adaptive behavior.
Apollonian forms of behavior are described by theology and anthropology
as well as psychology. Each of these disciplinary descriptions of
Apollonian behavior have relevance for the theory of Supersanity and
will be considered in turn.
Descriptions of Apollonian behavior in these various disciplines
include: "adhering to form," "being ordered," "rational," "emphasizing
individuality," or "focusing the individual on himself or his place"
(May, in Anderson, 1959; Dodds, 1971; Neitzsche, 1956; Benedict, 1934b).
A discussion of how these various descriptions of Apollonian behavior
apply to theology, anthropology, psychology, and the theory of Supersan-
ity follows.
Apollonian Aspects of Theology
The Apollonian distinction between the individual and the divine
forms an important aspect of various theologies. Here, however, discus-
sion will be limited, for the most part, to Christian theology as
lllus-
trative of Apollonian definitions of man.
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The distinction between the individual and the divine in Chris-
tian theology begins with the establishment of individuality, of separ-
ateness. The first step in this process is distinguishing man from God,
of highlighting those things that are characteristic of God but not of
man, and vice versa. Thus, discussing the characteristics of God in
Christian theology, Etienne Gilson (1941, pp. 52—54) writes!
There are, therefore, some beings that are radically different from
God at least in this that, unlike him, they might not have existed,
and still may, at some time, cease to exist. Thus to be, or exist,
is not at all to be, or exist, as God Himself is or exists. It is,
therefore, not to be an inferior sort of god; rather it is not be
be a god at all. . . . Man finds himself therein excluded from the
order of the divine. Between "Him who is" and ourselves, there is
an infinite metaphysical chasm which separates the complete self-
sufficiency of His own existence from the intrinsic lack of neces-
sity for our own existence.
Christian theology at once distinguishes man from God and dwarfs
man in the comparison. Man is "created" rather than ''begotten." That
is, his very existence is dependent upon an act of God, is received from
God (Agustine, in Copleston, Volume 2, 1964). Without God, man is noth-
ing. Man partakes not at all in the divine aspects of being in Apollonian
Christian theology (Gilson, 1941).
Once the generic differences between God and man are thus estab-
lished, Christian theology proceeds to lay the foundation for the separ-
ation of the individual man from the divine. This is accomplished by
the Christian myth of the "sinner," of man "fallen" and thus cut-off from
the grace of God (Ferre, 1967). While all of mankind is "fallen" because
of Original Sin, each individual man is also "fallen" or separated
from
God by his own sin. Except for Original Sin, sin is always
the result of
individual action, and it is equally impossible for
an individual not to
sin or not to act (Edwards, 1841).
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Thus
,
sin is what separates man from God or from the divine with-
in himself, and grace is what unites him with the divine both within and
without the self (Gilson, 1941). Grace, however, cannot be obtained by
man at will (Neibuhr, 1951). God's grace is obtained by man through the
observance of correct form.
Adherence to form in religious experience is, of course, another
dimension of Apollonianism. Through observance of correct form, man can
hope to establish contact with the divine and influence the divine in
certain ways. However, in this process, it is always the form and not
the individual that is powerful. H. Richard Neibuhr points to this in
Radical Montheism and Western Culture (1943, p. 51) when he writes:
By means of social ritual, doctine and tradition, it (faith) is
organized and directed toward certain objects and events. In
this process of organization, the form of faith is very influen-
tial.
From this discussion, it can be seen that Apollonianism isolates
man from the divine or non-finite in both generic and individual terms,
and in isolating him, it reduces the sources of power available to him.
Either he is restricted in his personal action by the effects of sin
upon his soul (Edwards, 1841) or he is dependent upon correct observance
of form in order to influence the divine (Neibuhr, 1943). In either
event, Apollonianism in theology limits man's experience by confining
him either to his finite self or to certain prescribed forms of inter-
action with the divine or non-finite dimensions of his experience.
The outcome of adherence to form and emphasis on the discrete-
ness of the individual is described by Gilber Murray in The
Five Stages
of Greek Religion (1955, p. 119) as follows:
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It is hard to describe. It is
. . . a sense of pessisism; a loss
of self-confidence, of hope in this life and faith in normal hu-
man effort; a despair of patient inquiry, a cry for infallible
revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the state. .
It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is not so
much to live justly, to help the society to which he belongs.
. .
but rather, by means of a burning faith, by contempt for the world
. . . to be granted pardon for his unspeakable unworthiness, his
immeasurable sins. There is an intensifying of certain spiritual
emotions, an increase of sensitiveness, a failure of nerve.
As the individual becomes more and more isolated from the power
of the divine or non-finite within himself, and becomes more and more
dependent upon form to contact or influence that power, his ability to
change and to become slows and ultimately stops. When this happens,
Apollonianism becomes synonymous with the maintenance of form and in-
dividuality—the Apollonian status quo.
This is the "failure of nerve" Murray speaks to. It is the
stagnation of theology and religion and individuals until the very in-
ertia of the process demands that Apollonianism be destroyed in favor
of dynamic experience and faith.
Apollonian Aspects of Anthropology
Within the field of anthropology, the concept of Apollonian and
Dionysian cultures was developed by Ruth Benedict in Patterns of Culture
( 1934b), and discussion of these concepts in anthropology will be limited
to Dr. Benedict’s outline of them.
In discussing Apollonianism in cultures, Dr. Benedict points out
that "adherence to form" is characteristic. As mentioned above in dis-
cussing Apollonianism in theology, form is used as a means of contacting
and influencing the divine, and it is always the form and not
the indi-
vidual in which power resides. This agrees with Dr.
Benedict s
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discussion of the religious practices of the Zuni. She describes them
as follows (1934b, p. 55f )
:
Zuni religious practices are believed to be supernaturally powerful
in their own right. At every step of the way, if the procedure is
correct, the costume of the masked god traditional to the last de-
the offerings unimpeachable, the words of hours long prayers
letter perfect, the effect will follow to man's desires.
And, Dr. Benedict also points out, Apollonian cultures in general, and
Zuni in particular, invest great amounts of societal energy in preserv-
ing form and ritual. In fact, ritual and ceremonial life may eclipse
all other concerns in Apolonian culture. For example, again speaking
of the Zuni, Dr. Benedict writes (1934b, pp. 54-55):
No field of activity competes with ritual for oremost place in
their attention. . . . The ceremonial life not only demands their
time, it preoccupies their attention. ... If an impersonator
wears a new feather on his mask, it eclipses all talk of sheep
or gardens or marriage or divorce.
Great investment of societal energy in ritual is, of course,
logical in an agricultural Apollonian society. For individuals are
powerless to influence the gods of rain and fertility; only the precise
observance of ceremony can do so. Therefore, powerless individuals
join in ritual to influence the crop and corn gods (Frazer, 1951).
Another characteristic of Apollonian society, says Dr. Benedict,
is lack of individualism. In Zuni, for example, there is no striving
for personal power, no emphasis on personal excellence. Power resides
in the ritual group or family to which one belongs, in particular, to
the ceremonies and ritual possessions that the group or the family con-
trols. However, when it is understood that the process of individuation
in Apollonian terms begins with the drawing of distinctions between man
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and god, we can better understand the lack of second-level individual-
.
12
.lty in Zuni.
The Zuni are an agricultural people and believe themselves de-
pendent upon their corn gods for survival, and the way to influence these
gods is through correct observance of ritual. But in the Zuni pueblos,
men are indeed seen as separate from the gods and made aware of the dis-
tinction between themselves and the divine. So they band together to
observe ritual; they join with others, powerless as themselves, to pro-
tect and participate in the source of power.
Because of dependence upon group cooperation in carrying on
ritual, the Zuni never develop second-level individuality as Christians
do. That is, there is no process in Zuni to distinguish each individual
man from the divine. The Zuni are without a concept of sin. However,
the Zuni are also culturally bound to expend the major portion of their
societal energy on the preservation of ritual. Thus, there is little
change.
Again, this is similar to Murray's (1955) concept of the failure
of nerve. Because Apollonian cultures give power to form, ritual and
ceremony, maintenance of form uses up most of the society's energy.
Thus, change and growth slows and ultimately stops. In extreme cases,
Apollonian societies can preserve detailed forms for thousands of years.
Witness Egyptian art which followed a prescribed form for nearly twenty-
five hundred years (Janson, 1966). However, they cannot adjust to or
^Second-level individuality is individuation of the individual.
That is, separation of man from god in generic terms is first-level in-
dividuality. Separation of the individual from the divine is second-
level individuality.
incorporate major changes. Thus, they must exist in isolation and
stagnation or be absorbed by more dynamic societies (Muller, 1954).
Apollonian Aspects of Psychology
Within the field of psychology, form and individuality are cru-
cial aspects of current theories dealing with sanity and insanity. As
discussed in Chapter II, sanity in current theory is partially defined
as the ability to think in logical or ordered ways; and the form which
thought takes is considered more important in these theories than the
outcome of the thought process (Kisker, 1964). This emphasis on form
and order is clearly Apollonian, as is emphasis on the awareness of in-
dividuality.
Sane/normal/adaptive is also partially defined, in present theory,
as the awareness of individuality (Erickson, 1959). In psychology, this
awareness of individuality becomes a third-level distinction, the first-
level of individuality is the separation of man from the divine in gen-
eric terms, and the second-level of individuality is the isolation of
the individual from the divine. Then, the third-level of individuality
is the separation of individual men from each other. This is the final
Apollonian distinction of individuality. And in current psychological
theory, only the insane/abnormal/maladapted individual is unaware of who
he is. As Alexander Lowen states in the opening lines of the Betrayal
of the Body (1967): "Normally, people don’t ask themselves, Who am I?
One’s identity is taken for granted. Each person carries in his wallet
papers that serve to identify him. . . . Consciously, he knows who he
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Sanity, in current psychological theory, means the boundaries
between the self and others must be clear and distinct. Sane/normal/
adaptive persons establish "identity" as individuals and in the roles
they play (May, 1953; Erickson, 1950). For example, in speaking of
personality development within the Freudian developmental model, Woodworth
and Sheehan (1964, p. 293) state:
At adolescence, the normal individual's ego will integrate the
assortment of identifications, apptitudes, and role experiences
which have accumulated through out earlier periods, and derive
an identity which is distinctly his own, and which, he is confi-
dent, bears a reasonable resemblance to what others think of him.
In contrast to this self-awareness and stability are the uncer-
tainty and experimental quality of the transcient identities tried
out by the adolescent whose psycho-social oddessy has not been well
guided, and who arrives at this stage of development with doubts
about his place in society.
However, the view that a well-established identity is necessary
for sanity is not limited to the Freudian view of sanity. It is preva-
lent in other theories also. In fact, psychology in general would agree
that if a person confuses himself with another he is either infantile,
like the neonate who is unable to distinguish between himself and his
mother's breasts, or insane, like the schizophrenic who is unable to
dinstinguish between appearance and reality or between himself and some
famous personage (Bellack and Blaustein, 1958)
.
In fact, Apollonian aspects of current theory are carried so
far that Lowen (1967) suggests that awareness of individuality must
correspond to the form of one's body, and any discrepancy between bod-
ily form and identity is insane/abnormal/maladaptive!
Thus, it can be seen that current psychological theories are
Apollonian in their focus on individuality. Of course this means that
individuality must follow a certain form, assume a certain mold which
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will serve to distinguish one man from another. And once the form of
individuality (or personality as it is more commonly expressed in psy-
chology) is set, an individual's energies will go into preserving it
(Edinger, 1972). Furthermore, as noted in the discussion on Apollonian-
ism in theology and anthropology, once form, ritual or role become so-
the process of change slows and may ultimately stop.
Therefore, it is possible as Erickson (1950) points out, for an
individual to attain the final form of his personality at the close of
adolescence. At this point, he permanently succeeds in distinguishing
himself from other men. Of course, maintenance of this distinction
will occupy his time and energy, and he will permit change in his iden-
tity only slowly and as the change is shown not to affect his individ-
uality, his distinguishability . As an Apollonian individual, he will,
like Apollonian culture, be unable to accommodate rapid or major change.
Thus, in all probability, he will maintain the personality of another
era in a rapidly changing society (Goldhamer and Marshall, 1953).
Apollonianism in Relation to the Theory of Supersanity
As discussed in Chapter II, the theory of Supersanity holds
that man is capable of apprehension in both finite and non-finite di-
mensions. This assertion contrasts to Dodds (1971) description of
Apollonianism as man's awareness of his separation from the divine
or non-finite. Furthermore, Apollonianism, because of its focus on
form, order and identity, keeps the individual within the sphere of
finite awareness. That is, the focusing on individuality in relation
to role and bodily function in psychology, and the centering on in-
dividuality in relation to man's separation from the divine or
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non-finite in theology and anthropology, ties man to sense perception
and the limits of time and space. Man can sense his separateness from
other men; he can measure the amount of time it takes to complete some
action; he can know his powerlessness to influence the world or to
change himself. This limiting of man's apprehension is, therefore, in
conflict with Supersanity’s assertion that man is capable of apprehen-
sion of both finite and non-finite dimensions and that sense perception
is not the only basis for knowledge (Rhine, 1937).
Also, because individuality is stressed in Apollonian theories
in theology, anthropology and psychology, the individual must, of nec-
essity, come to sense his separation from the universe as a whole; and
as his sense of separateness increased, so must his awareness of his
personal limitations. (The concept of sin in theology is just one ex-
ample of personal limitations being defined by Apolonian theories.) In
fact, the more Apollonian theories stress individuality (or the discrete-
ness of the individual) the more they remove the individual from the
sources of power within himself and outside of himself by promoting the
distinction between the individual and the non-finite or divine aspects
of being. Moreover, it can be seen that Apollonianism systematically
isolates man from God (or the external divine and non-finite) , from the
divine or non-finite within himself, and from both the finite and non-
finite in others. This is the purpose of the three levels of individ-
uality; and Apollonianism, thus, make man powerless in his separateness
from the varying parts of the universe.
However, as discussed in Chapter II, the theory of Supersanity
asserts that man is part of the natural order of the universe (Neibuhr,
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(1941). He is able to apprehend it in all its parts and has unity with
its purpose. Furthermore, he is powerful in his ability to use his
reason to apprehend, contact and shape the universe (Baker, 1947; Perry,
1956).
Thus, it can be seen that Apollonianism is inconsistent with
the theory of Supersanity and another perspective on man's relationship
to the divine and the non-finite must be sought.
Dionysian Considerations
Dionysian aspects of being, in current psychological theory,
are mainly limited to theories of creativity (May and Maslow, in
Anderson, 1959; Neitzsche, 1956) or are used as descriptions of other
than sane /normal/adaptive behavior (Braginsky, Braginsky and Ring,
13
1969). Dionysian behavior has been variously described as "ecstasy,"
"letting go," "a union with the universe," and the "destruction of in-
dividuality" (May, in Anderson, 1959; Dodds, 1971; Neitzsche, 1956).
Its important characteristics are the lack of form and order—being in-
stead spontaneous and chaotic—and the lack of a sense of individuality
and separateness—being instead a union between the individual and the
universe.
These Dionysian descriptions of behavior also occur in theology,
anthropology and psychology. A discussion of Dionysianism in these
13
The relationship of Dionysian characteristics with insane/
abnormal/maladaptive behavior can be seen in descriptions of the psy-
chotic as "deficient in discriminating reality, primitive. . . uncon-
trolled," or "unable to assume his own role" (Braginsky, Braginsky,
and Ring, 1969).
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disciplines and the relationship of Dionysianism to the theory of Super-
sanity follows.
Dionysian Aspects of Theology
Dionysianism in theology will be defined in Dodds (1971) terms
as man’s awareness of his unity with the divine or non-finite. Since
Dionysianism is not part of main-stream Christian theology, discussion
will include illustrations from other religious systems in addition to
Christian theology.
Dionysian theology, of course, emphasizes man's unity with the
divine both within and without the self. It promotes experience in which
man apprehends this unity, and the experience of unity with the divine,
like the Apollonian experience of separation from the divine, can occur
on three levels. These are man's awareness of the divine within him-
self, his cognizance of the similarity between himself and the divine,
and his comprehension and contact with the divine in others.
The level of man's awareness of the divine or non-finite within
himself occurs in many religious systems, and where it occurs, it seems
to have the effect of supressing or de-emphasizing individuality in fa-
vor of highlighting man's union with the universe. A capsule expression
of this type of experience occurs in The Birth of Tragedy (1956, p. 447)
where Neitzsche writes:
. .
(it) wishes to convince us of the eternal delight of exis-
tence, but it insists that we look for this delight not in the
phenomena but behind them. ... It forces us to gaze into the
horror of individual existence, yet without being turned to stone
by the vision; a methaphysical solace momentarily lifts us
above
the whirl of shifting phenomena. For a brief moment, we
become
outselves
,
the primal Being, and we experience its insatiable
hunger for existence. Now we see the struggle, the pain,
t e
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destruction of appearances, as necessary. ... We become one with
the immense lust for life and are made aware of the eternity and in-
destructibility of that lust. ... We realize our great good for-
tune in having life—not as individuals, but as part of the life
force with whose procreative lust we have become one.
Unlike Apollonian Christianity, Dionysianism does not contain
the concept of sin separating man from the divine within himself. In-
stead, the divine or non-finite is always within his grasp; he need only
let down the internal barriers between it and himself (Dodds, 1971).
Thus, Dionysianism, instead of limiting man to finite awareness
of himself, expands the limits of the individual and allows him to draw
upon the "life forces" which exist within, as well as without, the self
(Neitzsche, 1956; Kaufman, 1956).
This concept of man having access to all the power of the divine
or non-finite dimensions of the universe through contact with the self
forms an important part of Eastern religious dogma, especially in
Hinduism (Zimmer, 1956). For example, in discussing the process by
which the divine becomes known in Hindu religious thought, Zimmer (1956,
p. 12) writes:
The mythological creator, the Lord of the Universe, is no longer of
interest. Only the introvered awareness bent deep and driven to
the depth of the subject’s own nature reaches that borderline where
the transitiory superimpositions meet their unchanging source. And
such awareness can finally succeed even in bringing consciousness
across the border to merge—perish and become therewith imperish-
able—in the omnipresent substratum of all substance. I hat is,
the Self (atman)
,
the ultimate, enduring, supporting source of
being.
To fully understand Zimmer's statement, it is necessary to realize that
atman means both self and soul in Sanskrit (Watts, 19 j 9) , and in its
meaning as soul partakes of the divine essence of the One, the Only Soul
Brahmin (Zimmer, 1956).
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Another way in which Dionysian theology unites man with God is
in the sense of placing him in contact with or equating him with the ex-
ternal non-finite or the divine without himself. This contact or equa-
tion is established in several ways. The simplest and most common is by
a of passage which strips man of his finite nature at the same
time it exposes his divine attributes (Murray, 1955; Jung, 1969; Apuleius
,
1962). Rites of passage1 ^ were common in the mystery religions of the
Ancient Near East and the Roman Empire (Muller, 1954). They were Dionysian
and offered man salvation by showing him the way to join or become one
with the gods (Parkes, 1959; Apuleius, 1962). In fact, after initiation,
the Orphic devotee wore a golden scroll about his neck as a constant re-
minder of his unity with the divine. This scroll read, "I am the child
of Earth and of the starry Heaven. I too am become God" (Murray, 1955,
p . 142) .
Dionysianism also proffered direct access to the divine and non-
finite outside of man. Each man could be "his own priest" in a Dionysian
religion (Cox, 1969). In discussing this aspect of Dionysian societies,
Ruth Benedict notes that among the North American Indians the practice
of obtaining supernatural power or an interview with some divinity was
available to any member of the tribe who desired this experience. All
one had to do was find emotional expression intense enough to overcome
the pull of the common place (Benedict, 1934b).
While rites of passage and other ceremonies equating man with,
or allowing him to contact the divine or non-finite, may follow specific
forms in Dionysian religious ritual, these rituals are unlike Apollonian
ritual. Power does not reside in the form of the Dionysian ritual but
in the intense emotional experience of the participants (Frazer, 1951).
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Before considering the role of intense emotionality in Dionysian
religions and theologies, it is necessary to discuss man's ability to
experience the divine or non-finite in other men. This means that unlike
Apollonianism where men are isolated from each other in their own individ-
ualism, in the Dionysian experience of unity with the universe, man also
experiences unity with others (Cox, 1969; Cassirer, 1953, Neitzsche, 1956).
Dionysianism allows men to pool the power available to them; it makes the
individual stronger by allowing him contact with others who are also
powerful
.
The principle manner in which Dionysianism contacts the divine
within the self, in the external world, and in other men, is through in-
tense emotional experience. In Dionysianism, intense emotional experi-
ence serves the same function as form in Apollonianism; it lifts man from
the world of the common place to the realm of the divine (Parkes, 1959;
Zimmer, 1956; Kaufman, 1956). However, in this experience, it is always
the individual and not the rite or even the emotion being observed in
whom power and divinity reside.
Underneath any Dionysian emotional experience is a sense of
celebration, celebration of the power and divinity of being, celebra-
tion of man's participation in the unity of being (Neitzsche, 1956).
One of the effects of this celebration of being is, as Neitzsche (1956)
pointed out, the "destruction of individuality." In Dionysianism, man
is not a discrete individual but partakes of the divine or non-finite
within himself, without the self, and in others (May, 1969; Dodds, 1971).
Dionysianism expands man's limits, emerses him in the being of the uni
verse by blurring the boundaries of the self. The Dionysian loses the
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self in his ecstasy, in his intense emotional experience. This opens
the finite and non-finite power of the universe to man, makes him part
of it; it also creates gods and individuals who are difficult to dis-
tinguish from one another.
Dionysian Aspects of Anthropology
As with the concept of Apollonian culture, the concept of
Dionysian culture was first introduced by Ruth Benedict in Patterns of
Culture (1934b), and discussion of Dionysian culture will be, in the
main, limited to Dr. Benedict’s outline. However, since her description
of Dionysian culture is not as extensive as her description of Apollonian
culture, other relevant sources will also be considered.
Just as adherence to form is the outstanding characteristic of
Apollonian culture, intense emotional experience is characteristic of
Dionysian culture. In fact, little occurs in a Dionysian culture that
does not call for violent emotional expression. Thus, in discussing
the Kwaikiutl Indians of the Northwest Coast, Dr. Benedict (1934b)
catalogues the major events necessitating emotional release. These
range from birth, coming of age and marriage, to death, sickness or
accident. In fact, almost any event in Kwaikiutl calls forth passion-
ate outbursts. And emotions in this society can be powerful enough to
cause a man to "die of shame" or to commit suicide when events go con-
trary to his desires.
Dr. Benedict also notes that intense emotional experience is
the way in which man contacts or unites with the divine in Dionysian
society, and this experience of contact is open to anyone who so desires
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She further states that supernatural awareness gained by individuals in
Dionysian societies carry, in theory at least, authority to change cus-
tom. Thus, it would have been possible for an American Plains Indian to
bring about a major change in the custom of his tribe by claiming instruc-
tion to do so came from an interview with some deity.
From this, it can be seen that Dionysian cultures do not regard
societal forms as sacred and to be preserved with great expenditure of
societal energy (Parkes, 1959). Instead, Dionysian culture invests the
major portion of its energy in emotional experience and allows new forms
and customs to emerge in a dynamic manner.^
It has been noted that Dionysian involvement in emotional experi-
ence and creation of new or emerging forms is characteristic of the lower
classes in a stratified Apollonian society (Dodds, 1971; Cox, 1969).
That is, when the upper classes of a society are Apollonian, the lower
or oppressed classes will tend to be Dionysian and preserve the emotion-
alism, celebratoriness
,
and creativity of Dionysianism (Parkes, 1959;
Apulieus, 1962). And this undercurrent of Dionysianism will give the
society creative energy and new cultural forms.
This concept is not difficult to understand if Black America is
considered. The Dionysian sense of celebration still reigns in Black
Churches, and new forms of art are constantly emerging from within Black
Culture. As an example of this, of course, is gospel music and jazz
which originated in the celebrations of the Black Church and spread to
influence the Apollonian forms of our entire culture (Cox, 1969).
As Dr.
their
minor
15
It must, however, be noted that such change is
always slow,
enedict stated (1934, p. 76), "Even given the freest
scope by
istitutions, men are never inventive enough to make
more than
tanges
.
"
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The final aspect of Dionysian society to be considered is unity
with others. Dr. Benedict (1934b) points out that the actions of
Kwaikiutl are most often taken for individual aggrandizement. This
seems in conflict with the Dionysian idea of unity with the universe
and other men. However, when consideration is given to the fact that
even in individual action Dionysian man remains part of his society and
is integrated with the universe, it can be seen that even individual ac-
tions are group or universal actions. Thus, the glory attained by a
Kwaikiutl chief is glory for his tribe; the shame of an individual is
the shame of his family. Because the boundaries between individuals and
between man and the gods are blurred in Dionysian societies, every action
is part of the universal being. There is no way to separate man from
others in Dionysian society for even in the most self-centered of ac-
tions he remains a part of his group, family and the community of being.
Dionysian Aspects of Psychology
Unlike the somewhat unified view of Apollonian psychology, there
are two streams of Dionysianism in current psychology. The first equates
Dionysian behavior with insane/abnormal/maladaptive behavior, and the
second views Dionysian behavior as part of the specialized human activ-
ity of creativity. There are, of course, a few rare individuals such
as Norman 0. Brown (1959) who view Dionysian behavior as characteristic
of healthy individuals. Discussion of these streams will begin with
equation of Dionysianism with insanity /abnormality/maladaptivity and
touch only briefly on creativity. Views on Dionysian behavior and
health will be included in the section on Dionysianism and the theory
of Supersanity.
The most obvious way in which insane/abnormal/maladaptive be-
havior is equated with Dionysian behavior is in the question of identity.
As mentioned earlier, current psychological theories equate possession
of a clearly formed and delineated personality with sanity or normality
(Erickson, 1950; Lowen, 1967). In fact, Kisker (1964, p. 337) in dis-
cussing the symptoms of psychosis writes: "This symptom (disorientation)
is one of the important signs indicating a break with reality. The pa-
tient who is disoriented does not know who he is."
Since Dionysianism emphasizes man’s unity with the universe and
the others in it instead of a discrete, separate identity, Dionysianism
is in conflict with prevailing views of sanity. It would be very diffi-
cult for an individual who views identity in Dionysian terms to present
this view to an Apollonian clinician and be viewed as sane. Identity
within a group is not an alternative to a well-defined, third-level,
personal individuality (Edignger, 1972).
Another source of conflict between Dionysianism and the pre-
vailing Apollonian view of sanity/normality/adaptivity is Dionysian em-
phasis on intense emotional experience. Within Dionysian experience,
intense emotional expression, whether of passion, grief, anger, or the
like is acceptable, even sought after. However, within the Apollonianism
of present-day psychology, this is not acceptable; intense emotional ex-
perience is labelled "acting out" behavior (Burton and Harris, 1955) or
"emotional disturbance and unbalance" (Kisker, 1964). In fact, the
Apollonianism of current psychology is so pervasive as to suggest a
"golden mean" is the acceptable mode of emotional expression. Ihus, in
describing "emotional disturbance" among psychotics, Kisker (1964, p. 341)
writes
:
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The psychotic patient frequently shows various forms of emotionaldisturbance. Some patients are emotionally impulsive, while others
seem to have a complete lack of emotional responsiveness.
The emotionally impulsive patient is completely unpredictable.
Without apparent cause.
. . such patients may act out in an aggres-
sive or sexual way.
. . . The complete absence of emotional respon-
siveness is also found in psychotic patients. Such patients neither
laugh nor smile, nor do they appear depressed.
As can be seen from this example, it is unacceptable to current
psychology to express too much or too little emotion—an even emotional
keel is what is considered sane/normal/adaptive (Burton and Harris, 1955)
But to accept or seek intense emotional experience and expression as
Dionysianism does is completely unacceptable except within some few,
specialized areas of human experience.
And in a few specialized areas of human experience, Dionysianism
and intense emotional experience is seen as acceptable to current psy-
chology. This is true of psychological theories of creativity. For
example, Rollo May (in Anderson, 1959) outlines conditions for creativ-
ity in art and speaks of talent and encounter. Encounter is similar to,
but not synomous with, Dionysian intense emotional experience. Also,
Abraham Maslow (in Anderson, 1959) discusses the "peak experience" in
which an individual feels united within himself and with the world.
This is similar to the Dionysian experience of "unity with the universe.'
However, the theories of both May and Maslow are limited to one aspect
of human experience and do not offer a comprehensive, Dionysian descrip-
tion of human behavior.
No, it must be concluded that Dionysianism is in conflict with
the prevailing psychological views of sanity/normality/adaptivity except
in a few, limited instances.
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ianism in Relation to the Theory of Supersanity
As discussed above, Apollonianism is unacceptable to the theory
of Supersanity. Supersanity holds that man is an inseparable part of
the universe, capable of awareness and apprehension in both finite and
non-finite dimensions. Apollonianism separates man from the divine or
non-finite on varying levels and limits him to finite awareness. Thus,
the theory of Supersanity must find another base from which to describe
man's relationship to the divine and non-finite.
This base is, of course, Dionysianism. Dionysianism is consis-
tent with the theory of Supersanity in its emphasizing of man's unity
with the universe and its insistence that man is capable of contact with
the divine or non-finite on varying levels.
Within Dionysian experience, man is also integrated and in con-
tact within himself. This Dionysian experience of integration within
the self and with the universe is similar to the "peak experience"
Maslow (in Anderson, 1959) felt was characteristic of self-actualizing
individuals. These were persons who were both creative and emotionally
very healthy. Maslow describes the "peak experience" of this type of
individual as follows (in Anderson, 1959, p. 89):
an essential aspect of the peak—experience is integration within
the person and therefore between the person and the world. In
these state of being, the person becomes unified; for the time
being, the splits, polarities and dissociations within him tend
to be resolved; the civil war within. . . is transcended. In
such a state, the person becomes far more open to experience and
far more spontaneous and fully functioning.
Dionysianism also allows man "to look not at phenomena but behind them"
(Neitzsche, 1956), to separate appearance from reality. Speaking to
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this point, Norman 0. Brown (1959, pp. 175-176) describes Dionysian
experience in the following way:
Apollo rules over the fair world or appearance as a projection of
the inner world of fantasy; and the limit which he must observe
that delicate boundary which the dream-picture must not overstep,"
is the boundary of repression separating the dream from instinctual
reality.
Dionysus is not dream but drunkenness; not life kept at a distance
and seen through a veil but life complete and immediate.
. . .
Dionysus is the image of the instinctual reality which psycho-
analysis will find on the other side of the veil.
Brown and Maslow's view of Dionysianism (and it is in accord with the
theory of Supersanity) holds that Dionysian experience, perhaps because
its intensity and immediacy, allows man a more real perspective of
himself and the universe. This perspective is not colored by dichotomies
within the person, or by societal insistence on adherence to a mean; it
is, instead, perspective gained by direct experience.
Inherent in Dionysianism is recognition of man's ability to ap-
prehend on both finite and non-finite levels. Dionysianism recognizes
this ability, views man as powerful, and gives him ability to utilize
this power within the universe (Brown, 1959; Parkes, 1959; Neitzsche,
1956).
Dionysian power and action according to Rollo May (1969, p. 164)
has "its source. . . in those realms where the self is rooted in natural
forces which go beyond the self. . . (it) arises from the ground of be-
ing rather than from the self as such." Dionysianism allows man to lose
himself in instinctual action, to free himself from the social norm
(Kaufman, 1956), to integrate or transcend the dichotomies within him-
self (Maslow, in Anderson, 1959) , to act in ways other than self-cen-
soring (Brown, 1959).
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Because Dionysian actions come from man’s ground of being, they
are in perfect accord with man's nature, and it is thus difficult to
speak of what is traditionally labelled Dionysian excess (Dodds, 1971).
Within Dionysian action, man acts in accord with his nature; he is at
one within himself and does not repress or sublimate, but acts out his
feelings in the moment of their experience (Brown, 1959). Thus,
Dionysianism does not limit man but instead allows him to be what he is,
part of the universe, powerful and emotional, a unity within himself, a
unity with the finite and non—finite nature of the universe, and with
the essence of other men.
Dionysianism Exercised with Commitment and
Responsibility within the Theory of Supersanity
The theory of Supersanity holds that Supersane individuals are
Dionysian in their basic approach to life. They are aware of the divine,
non-finite or power within themselves and are also aware of their unity
with the world and with others. Supersane individuals do not filter
emotional experience through societal norms so that their emotional ex-
pressions conform to acceptable standards. Their emotional experience
is direct, intense, passionate, violent, etc.
However, Supersane individuals also exercise Dionysianism within
a framework of commitment and responsibility. That is, Supersane indi-
viduals share in the Dionysian sense of celebration, of free expression
of intense, emotional experience. However, they do so in ways that tend
to affirm the purpose of life. This purpose, as noted in Chapter II, is
positive and always towards health and wholeness (Rogers, 1969; Jung,
1969).
51 .
It may be possible to speak of Dionysian excess in individuals
who are partaking in pseudo-Dionysian experience where violent, hostile
or passionate emotions are given free play and destructive actions occur
(Frazer, 1951). However, in true Dionysian experience, in Supersane ex-
perience, the individual has gone through a two-level process of inte-
gration; he is one within himself and with the external world. Thus, he
can only act in concert with himself and the external world. And since
it has been established that the teleology of both the individual and
the universe is positive (Sinnott, 1955; Matthews, 1936), it must be
concluded that actions taken after the Dionysian experience of internal
and external integration are in accord with this positive teleology.
Thus, The Countess Aurelia (Giraudou, 1958), even in expressing
violent emotions and destroying others in Dionysian spirit, does so
within a framework of the purpose of the universe. Her actions are in
accord with what would be considered health and wholeness. She destroys
that which is insensitive to human need and is willing to sacrifice
others for personal gain. The destruction of The President and The
Prospector is in accord with the drive toward health and wholeness. And
it is in perfect accord with Dionysianism that the celebration of the
destruction of The President and The Prospector is done without remorse
or guilt, but instead freely expressing the emotions The Countess is
feeling. It is also Dionysian that The Countess hold a trial and in-
clude her comrades in her decision to eliminate the threat to Paris.
It is also Dionysian that she acts in accord with her own sense of value
and purpose. She acts in accord with her self-integration and her inte-
gration with others. And she acts in a way that the others around her
are unable to.
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The other Supersane individual whom we have thus far considered,
Yossarian (Heller, 1970), is also acting in Dionysian ways, intensely
expressing his emotions. He is at one moment a passionate coward, at
the next a passionate lover, and then again a violent defender of his
friends’ rights. But whatever feelings he does express, he expresses
them both in accord with his nature and feelings and for the purpose of
furthering health and wholeness. That is, Yossarian is in perfect ac-
cord with himself and others when he finally decides not to accept the
medal and go home a hero. He is acting on his perception of his unity
within himself and his perception of the unity or purpose of the universe.
He takes instead what is considered an insane course—rowing to Sweden
in a liferaft—but a course that is consistent with his emotions, his
internal integration of himself, and with the non-finite dimensions of
experience which tell him he will get to Sweden.
Neither The Countess Aurelia nor Yossarian express their emo-
tions in terms of the societally acceptable mean. Instead, they permit
others to see their direct and often violent emotional experience.
They do not appear to have learned to dissemble. This is also true of
those hospitalized individuals who were discussed in Chapter I. They
had not seemed to learn to express their emotions in the ways the hos-
pital staff found acceptable. Instead, they expressed their emotions
as they experienced them. Their Dionysian orientation was so great
that the direct contact with reality overshadowed the pressure of the
social norm.
However, there was something different in their expression of
emotion than that of other patients. Those few individuals
who were
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Supersane never showed inappropriate emotions in given situations.
Their emotions were always appropriate, if not acceptable, to a given
situation. Thus, one of them was confined to seclusion for telling a
doctor that he spent very little time with the patients. His statement
was, of course, true and he was unjustly and unnecessarily confined.
In this situation, this patient expressed his anger and his outrage
in real terms. He did not sit quietly by and let the hospital situa-
tion dictate how his emotions should be expressed. He acted as he
felt. And he did this in a situation where it was dangerous to do so.
But he maintained his integration within himself and with his sense of
unity with the universe.
The sense of unity with the universe gives to the Supersane in-
dividual the understanding that power is available to him if he chooses
to use it. Thus, Yossarian, Aurelia and other Supersane individuals
are often able to perform tasks that seem beyond the scope of a single
individual. But the Supersane individual has at his disposal the non-
finite power of himself and others. Thus, McMurphy in One Flew Over
the Cuckoo’s Nest (Kesey, 1962) is able to make sweeping changes on
Big Nurse’s ward by tapping the power in others and uniting individuals
in the battle. He is able to draw others to him, first by his own
power, and then by recognizing the power in them.
Thus, it must be concluded that it is impossible for the Super-
sane individual not to act in Dionysian ways, but that these Dionysian
actions are in accord with the purpose of the universe and his nature
as man. In acting as a Dionysian, the Supersane individual is express-
ing his own power and the power of the "life force" of which he is a
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part. It is the Supersane individual's awareness of his finite and non-
finite bonds with the "life force" that allows him to act in Dionysian
ways within the framework of commitment and responsibility, expressed
by acting in accord with the teleological purpose of health and whole-
ness.
CHAPTER IV
MYTH, APPEARANCE AND REALITY
IN THE THEORY OF SUPERSANITY
Things arent's always as they seem
And who's to tell waking from the
dream.
Olive Schreiner
As mentioned in Chapter I, characteristics of Supersane individ-
uals include possession of personal myths and the ability to discrimin-
ate between appearance and reality. Because these characteristics are
related in terms of their function in current theories of sanity-insanity
and in Supersane individuals, they will be discussed in the same chapter,
first myth and then appearance and reality.
Myth
Myth plays a dual role in current theories dealing with sanity-
insanity or describing human behavior. It is either regarded as a symp-
tom of disorder, as in the case of the psychotic who constructs myths
to indicate that he is someone or something else (Lowen, 1967; Burton
and Harris, 1955); or myth is seen as possessing positive direction
for human growth as in the postulates of C. G. Jung (1938) and Thomas
J. J. Altizer (1962).
However, before we consider the positive and negative views of
the function of myth in human behavior, it is necessary to define
myth.
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Sir Maurice Bowra in The Greek Experience (1959, p. 115) describes myth
in the following way:
Myth is a story which aims not at giving pleasure for its own sake
but at alleviating perplexities which trouble man because his rea-
son is not yet ready to grasp them. . . . The mythical explanation
... is more emotional than rational and works not by describing
cause and effect, but by associating one kind of experience with
another and suggesting a connection or similarity between them.
. . .
(Myths) bring the unknown into relation with the known and help to
break down the barriers between men and the intractable mass of
phenomena which surround them.
As Bowra indicates, myths begin by association of experience, but also
things, people and events with some unknown in order to make the unknown
knowable. Mythopoeia often begins with creation of a sign (Sebba, 1962;
Tillich, 1955). The sign has a conventional meaning which is precise
and unequivocal; it is a short-hand representation of a more complicated
message (Tillich). Thus, a red octagon with the word STOP actually means
"Stop here before proceeding through the intersection." Early Christians
drew a fish in the sand to indicate "I am a Christian." The meaning of
the fish was fixed by convention to signify "I am a Christian" and noth-
ing more; the fish was a sign as the red octagon is a sign.
Yet with the passage of time, the sign of the fish became asso-
ciated with less precise meanings, acquired divergent associations it
represented Christian faith; the individuals who, past and present, held
that faith; the feeding of five thousand with two fish; Jesus calling
disciples to be fishers of men; and so forth. The fish ceased to be
short-hand for a simple message; it represented people’s experience of
of their faith. It pointed beyond itself to a higher reality. Once
this happened, the fish became a symbol. In describing symbols, Paul
Tillich has said (1955, p. 109), "This is the great function of
symbols,
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to point beyond themselves in the power of that to which they point, to
open up levels of reality which otherwise are closed, to open up levels
of the human mind which we otherwise are not aware."
However, once the sign becomes a symbol, it does not lose its
contact with immediate human experience. It, instead, brings immediate
human experience into contact with higher reality. This process is
described by Eliade and Kitagawa (1959, p. 246) as follows:
Symbols still keep their contact with the profound sources of life;
they express, one might say, the "spirit as lived". . . . They re-
veal the modalities of the spirit and are at the same time manifes-
tations of life, and consequently, they directly engage human exis-
tence. The symbol not only unveils a structure of reality or a di-
mension of existence; by the same stroke, it brings a meaning into
human existence. This is why even symbols aiming at the ultimate
reality conjointly constitute existential revelations.
In fact, by being included in the actions of daily living, symbols are
transformed into myths (Sebba, 1962). That is, when a man puts his
symbols into action in daily life, the symbol acquires the properties
of myth; the individual experiences contact with a different reality,
a relationship or similarity between the known and the unknown that
allows him to act in new and more positive ways. The myth becomes a
way for the individual to contact reality and possibly change it.
Also, once the symbol is transformed into myth by action, it
also acquires personal meaning and power for the individual. That is,
a group or societal myth can be changed by personal action into a per-
sonal myth; or individuals can choose to actualize symbols in their
daily actions and create myth apart from the society or group to which
they belong (Gotesky, 1952).
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Negative Views of Myth in Psychology
This discussion and definition of myth is, thus far, true of
those theories in which myth has positive value. The definition of
myth in current psychological theory is, of course, different. Myth,
in these theories, is considered "false belief" or "fantasy and fable"
(Sebba, 1962). It is felt to exist in "the night of ignorance and the
twilight of uncertainty" (Gotesky, 1952), or to be the product of "a
disturbed mind creating fantasies without reference to reality" (Kisker,
1964). Myth in its negative aspects is equated with fantasy and delusion.
A myth is viewed as something not at all real, as based wholly on an in-
dividual’s inaccurate perception of reality. The fact that an individual
might act or express himself in terms of a myth is confirmation of his
insanity/abnormal ity/maladapt ivi ty
.
In its negative aspects in psychology, myth is seen as inconsis-
tent with a rational (logical) society or individual (Gotesky, 1952).
Myth is an inadequate way of explaining individual or societal experience
(Altizer, 1962); it is "prescientif ic" and does not describe reality but
superstition (Sebba, 1962).
Describing the characteristics of the psychosis, Kisker (1964,
p. 337) speaks of the delusion which is often equated with negative
views of myth in the following way:
A delusion, which is a belief contrary to reality, is another im-
portant symptom of psychotic thinking. Patients frequently hold
ideas which are improbable or obviously untrue. While many people
who are not mentally ill also cling to such ideas, they do not or-
dinarily continue to hold them in the face of clear evidence to
the contrary. The psychotic patient, however, persists in his
delusional ideas in spite of rational (logical) arguments, contra-
dictory evidence, or sheer impossibility. . . •
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In Cervantes novel Don Quixote
,
the hero develops the romantic de-
lusion that windmills are giants, inns are castles, prostitutes are
great ladies, galley slaves are oppressed gentlemen, and a flock of
sheep is the army of the giant.
The possibility that ideas (myths) may be maintained in view of clear
evidence to the contrary and be a sign of emotional health will be dis-
cussed in relationship to the function of myths within the theory of
Supersanity. At present, only the negative view of myth in current psy-
chological theory is being considered, and it seems appropriate to let
Kisker's statement stand without further comment.
Let it suffice to say that texts on abnormal psychology are full
of accounts of delusions, varied and fablous, among psychotics
.
^ And
these descriptions of delusions may be considered descriptions of current
theory’s view of myth.
It is possible to make this link between myth and delusion in
current psychological theory because current psychological theory uses
myth when referring to inaccurate perceptions or beliefs held by soci-
eties, and delusion when referring to inaccurate perceptions or beliefs
held by individuals (Sebba, 1962; Gotesky, 1952). Both are described
as differing degrees of the same abnormal or maladaptive tendency and
felt to be out of place in rational (logical) man.
Finally, it is significant to note that even Thomas Szasz in
describing the outmoded view of mental illness in our society has cho-
sen to call his work The Myth of Mental Illness (1961) and to describe
16
See Burton and Harris (1955) Clinical Studies of Persona^..
Dollard and Miller (1950) Personality and Psychotherapy, Kisker
(1964)
The Disoreanized Personality, Goldhamer and Marshall (1953)
Psycho
s
i s
and Civilization , or Beliak and Blaustein (1958), Schizophrenia:
A
Review of the Syndrome in this regard.
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outmoded views as based on inaccurate perceptions of reality and irra-
tional and unscientific views of mental illness. Thus, this demonstrates
that the negative view of myth is so entrenched in current psychological
theory that the severest critics of a psychological construct choose the
word myth as the ultimate derogation.
Positive Views of Myth in Psychology
Positive views of myth in psychology hold that myths serve an
affirmative function in individuals and societies; that is, myths are
seen as contributing to social and individual development in necessary
and healthy ways. Thus, speaking of the function of myth in society,
Gotesky (1952, p. 530) writes:
Every culture will create and value its own myths, not because it
may not be able to distinguish between truth and falsity, but be-
cause their function is to preserve a culture against disruption
and destruction. They serve to keep men going against defeat,
frustration, disappointment.
Myths in society, says Ralph Ross in Symbols and Civilization (1962),
are important because they symbolize the relationship of man to society
and to nature. They furnish the individual with a framework with which
to view himself, his society, and the natural world. Myths lessen the
fear of the individual facing vast amounts of unknown experience by
associating the unknown with the known (Sebba, 1962).
A similar view of the function of myth for the individual exists
in the analytic psychology of C. G. Jung and his disciples. Within
Jungian psychology, myths are called by various names: archetypes,
dominants, primordial images, imagos, and mythological images
(Hall
and Lindzey
,
1967). While this plethera of terms is confusing, the
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view of myth is consistent within Jungian psychology regardless of the
term being used.
This view interprets myth as an accumulation of man's evolution-
ary, psychic experiences (Jung and Kerenyi, 1949). Myths are a perma-
nent deposit, in the human psyche, of an experience which has been con-
tinuously repeated throughout human experience. Jung describes the
process of the development of myth in terms similar to those used above
in the discussion of the evolution of a sign into symbol into myth.
Within Jungian psychology, a myth begins with a repeated human experi-
ence, for example, with man's experience with woman. From this experi-
ence develops symbols for woman— the mother, the wife, the temptress,
etc. And finally the symbols are drawn together in the psychic consto-
lation of the archetype. The archetype, thus, contains myths and symbols
and response patterns appropriate to this experience of woman (anima)
(Jung, 1969; Campbell, 1971).
The archetype forms part of the collective unconscious in Jung's
theories (1959), and the collective unconscious is a common, racial in-
heritance of all men. It is unlike the personal unconscious in that
"The contents of the collective unconscious have never been in conscious-
ness, and therefore have never been individually acquired, but owe their
existence exclusively to heredity" (Campbell, 1971, p. 60). The collec-
tive unconscious is, then, the collection of archetypes (myths) common
to all men; it is the repository of not only repeated human experiences
but repeated human explanations of personal and societal experience
(Jung, 1959).
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Within the archetypes (myths) of the collective unconscious,
Jung postulates the existence of four main archetypes which constitute
the personality of the individual; these are the persona, the anima,
the animus, and the shadow. These four archetypes, says Jung (1939),
are opposed or strive to dominate each other. But, he says, this strug-
gle has a purpose, a positive teleology, which is development of the
Self. The Self (which is an archetype or myth) is life's goal, and like
all archetypes, it motivates man's behavior and causes him to search for
wholeness. This search for wholeness is facilitated and directed by the
myth.
Jung also states (1916) that man's personality is to be compre-
hended not by where it has been but by where it is going. He, of
course, feels that the personality of man is moving towards reality and
wholeness through the motivation and direction of myth in human experi-
ence (1939).
This last point, that of myth directing and motivating man to
achieve wholeness and contact with reality, is a crucial one to both
Jungian psychology and the theory of Supersanity.
Myth in Relation to the Theory of Supersanity
The theory of Supersanity is in accord with the Jungian postu-
late of myth-motivating and directing man to wholeness and reality.
It views myth in this positive light and holds that possession of
both
archetypal and personal myth is characteristic of Supersane individuals
Personal myths are necessary because too often, individuals
define them. They accept others' definitionshave allowed others to
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of who they are and act in ways that confirm these definitions. They
do not have the strength or the direction to hold out against the pres-
sure of accepting this definition, of not conforming to the social norm.
It is considered a sign of sane/normal/adaptive behavior when one's
view of himself corresponds to others' definition of him (Erickson,
1950). However, it is possible for others' definitions of an individ-
ual to be damaging and destructive."^
Personal myths are necessary because they provide the individual
with a base from which to act and afford a goal toward which to strive.
If an individual has no goal toward which to strive, he remains always
as he is. Once he has accepted others' definition of himself, he is
complete. The lack of goals is remarkable in our society. Man is ali-
enated, and Jung points to the fact that the contemporary feeling of
alienation is due to a lack of personal myths. "In former times," he
says (1969, p. 69), "men did not reflect upon their myths, they lived
them." And, of course, Jung equates possession of personal myths with
the sane/adaptive/normal functioning of the human being. The theory of
Supersanity also equates possession of personal myths with what is
whole and healthy in human behavior.
This possession of personal myth in a Supersane individual can
be seen in The Countess Aurelia (Giraudou, 1958). The Countess, as
mentioned above, believed the world to be a place in which love and
gentleness and kindness were the order of the day. This was her myth,
this gave her a base from which to act and a goal toward which to
go.
"^Refer to the case study in Appendix A for a description
o
the damaging effects to an individual accepting other's
definition o
the self and subsequently developing no personal myth.
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She had succeeded in integrating her self to actualize this myth. Of
course, there was a great deal of objective evidence to the contrary,
the world could be shown to be a place where greed and cruelty and
hate were more prevalent than the emotions embodied in The Countess
myth. And by acting in accord with her myth, The Countess' behavior
was not in accord with the societal norms which surrounded her. Yet,
The Countess chose to disregard this and to continue acting on her
myth and, of course, her myth proved to be the more powerful and the
more real force in the play.
There are numerous other examples of literary characters who
have also chosen to act upon their myths in defiance of social norms
or evidence to the contrary. Thus, Don Quixote (Cervantes, 1937) ac-
cepted the myth of chivalry and interpreted the world in accord with
it. While windmills may not be giants, is it not possible for prosti-
tutes to be great ladies a la Madame Pompadour or for galley slaves to
be great gentlemen a la Ben Hur? Don Quixote chose to act on this myth
because it gave him a goal, a direction, support for his attempt to in-
tegrate the self, while also providing him with a framework with which
to act in the present. He wanted to be the perfect knight, strove toward
this goal while acting chivalrously in the present.
Or consider the case of Cyrano De Bergerac (Rostand, 1953).
Cyrano believed in the immutable virtue of the individual, of main-
taining dignity in the face of whatever odds. Society would have told
him that this was impossible, that everyone is a little corrupt. But
Cyrano held out, maintained his dignity and went to stand Judgement
with his white plume "unblemished and unbent.
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Yossarian also possessed personal myths. This is not as clear
in his case as in the histories of the literary characters already cited.
However, when he makes the decision not to accept the medal and pedal
away to Sweden, he is acting on his myth. It is the myth on which he
has been acting all along. It is the myth that the individual has the
right to survive with dignity and respect regardless of what society de-
mands of him. Yossarian, in his final action, makes final commitment to
his myth and rushes into the sea confident that he will soon be with Orr
in Sweden
.
Another literary history in which personal myth plays a power-
ful role in the lives of the characters is Lord of the Rings by J . R. R.
Tolkein (1965) . This is a mythic history and thus myth acquires new di-
mensions in this work. But its function in the lives of the characters,
Gandalf and Frodo, is the same as in the works cited above. It provides
the Wizard and the Hobbit a base from which to act and a goal toward
which to go. They act in accord with their perception of the way in
which things should be in Middle Earth, and their perceptions are simi-
lar to those of The Countess Aruelia. They act to destroy the power of
the One Ring. And throughout their action, despite insurmountable odds
they succeed in actualizing their myth. In the novel Gandalf , the
Wizard has already developed his myth and the story is, in part, about
the development of a similar myth in the Hobbit, Frodo. Once the two
characters have developed their myths, they have the power to overcome
the One Ring. But the myth is necessary to do so.
In all these instances, personal myths seem to have the
ability
to withstand pressure to conform to social norms. They seem
able to
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keep the individual moving toward the goal of wholeness while providing
a framework for being in the present. And, of course, possession of
personal myth is not limited to Supersane literary characters. Histor-
ical individuals have also possessed and actualized personal myths
against severest pressure to conform to social norms. In this sense,
Supersane individuals seem to have "an internal locus of evaluation"
which allows them to be the prime critic of their actions and to chose
their evaluations over those of society. This is similar to the concept
as postulated by Rogers (1958, in Anderson). In describing this phenom-
ena, Rogers (p. 76) states: "If the person has the ’feel' of being 'me
in action,' of being an actualization of potentialities in himself which
heretofore have not existed are now emerging into existence, then it is
satisfying and creative and no outside evaluation can change that." What
this seems to imply for the theory of Supersanity is that personal myth
serves as a basis from which to evaluate the events surrounding the in-
dividual, and that the individual seems more often than not to choose
his own myth over that of the societal norm.
In cases of historical individuals, this can be clearly seen.
For example, Jesus developed a myth that he was the Messiah, the king
chosen to show men to way to God. He accepted and actualized this myth
even though society told him he was a carpenter, uneducated, and from
a poor and rural family (Graves, 1946). And he chose to die rather than
act in ways not in accord with his personal myth. Or again, consider
Malcolm X who developed the myth that Black was powerful. He
lived
this myth in the face of social norms and pressures to the
contrary;
the face of clear, objective evidence to thehe lived the myth in
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contrary. And, in the end, he died for his myth; but he never compro-
mised it; he actualized it. In fact, the case of Malcolm X clearly
shows the power of myth to change a reality. The reality of Malcolm's
myth would not be disputed now, but when it was created it was consid-
ered to be absurd. But because it gave Malcolm a framework for being
in the present, it also became a reality in the future. Today, Black is
powerful, and Malcolm's myth is the myth of many others. And the reality
that he alone experienced in 1960 is the reality of many in 1973.
As a final example of the role of personal myth in the lives of
actual individuals, consideration will be given to hospitalized individ-
uals who have demonstrated possession of personal myth. As pointed out
in Chapter I, Supersane individuals who have been wrongly labelled insane
do not conform to hospital expectations of a "good patient." Instead,
they seem to cling to some internally determined sense of what or who
they are. Many of these individuals also possess what may be considered
personal myths. Some of these myths are concerned with the dignity of
man, but others may resemble what some call delusions. Thus, one individ-
ual left a position as chief corporate attorney for Merril, Lynch to be-
come a chicken farmer in Vermont. He believed that a life close to the
earth was the natural way for a man to live, and he left his position
to actualize his newly developed myth. He was commited because of this
action and therapy centered on getting him to accept the foolishness of
his actions. But he maintained his myth, and he maintained it in the
face of electroconvulsive therapy, psychotherapeutic drugs, seclusion,
therapy, and the like. He remained unmovable in his conviction
that he
must be a farmer. He rejected others' definition of him as a corporate
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attorney. He also used the myth to act on in the present and to provide
a goal toward which to go. The myth was his reality; he could not change
it. He had become what his myth had said he was; and he too maintained
it in the face of amazing odds.
It has been shown that one of the characteristics of the Super-
sane individual is the possession of personal myths and acting in accord
with these myths in spite of pressure to conform to social norms. These
personal myths give Supersane individuals a framework with which to view
the present and a goal for the future. Personal myths also seem to allow
Supersane individuals to change reality in the actualization of their
myths. That is, by acting out the myth in the present, the myth becomes
a reality in the future. Also, as has been noted, these myths seem to
be in accord with a positive teleology, with the movement of the individ-
ual toward the development of the Self (Jung, 1938), or toward the goal
of wholeness (Rogers, 1969).
Appearance and Reality
As mentioned above, a characteristic of the Supersane individual
is the ability to distinguish between appearance and reality. This
characteristic is related to the possession of personal myths which
allow an individual to strive toward the creation of a new reality.
However, before considering the ability to distinguish between appear-
ance and reality in the theory of Supersanity , it is necessary to define
terms and discuss the philosophical and psychological implications of
appearance and reality.
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Philosophical Implications of Appearance and Reality
In Chapter I, it was stated that questions related to the nature
of knowledge or to appearance versus reality are epistemological and re-
lated to questions dealing with the sources and the validity of knowledge
The epistemological questions asked in dealing with the issue of appear-
ance versus reality are: "Is there a real, objective world outside of
the mind" and "What is its nature?" (Titus, 1959, p. 50). These ques-
tions are equally important to philosophy, psychology and the theory of
Supersanity.
In philosophy, there are three traditional answers to the ques-
tion of appearance versus reality and the nature of knowledge. They are
naive realism, epistemological idealism and objectivism (Montague, 1925),
Each of the three answers the question of appearance versus reality in a
different way.
For example, naive realism assumes that the distinctions between
thoughts and things, object and the knower of the object are fixed and
common to all spectators (Martin, 1957; Montague, 1925). That is, a
group of people observing an event will experience the same things be-
cause the events have an existence, a reality, of their own; and the
data of the observers’ sense organs will give each separate individual
an objective, accurate and similar picture of this reality (Sinclair,
1951).
An important expression of this philosophical position occurs
in the epistemological theories of Thomas Hobbs (1939) , especially in
the opening lines of Levianthan where he writes
:
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Concerning the thoughts of man.
. . they are everyone a representa-
tion or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body with-
out, which is commonly called an object. Which object worketh on
the eyes, ears and other parts of a man's body, and by working pro—
duceth a diversity of appearances.
Hobbes felt that knowledge gained by the impression of the senses was
real knowledge of an external reality. But is it?
There are, of course, many psychological experiments (Bruner,
1951; Allport and Pettigrew, 1957; Sherif, 1935) which indicate that
sense perception gives differing information depending on the individual
and the circumstances. These will be considered in the section on the
relationship between psychology and appearance and reality. However,
it is possible to apply a common-sense view to this theory and demonstrate
its inadequacies (Titus, 1959). For example, in a community of the deaf
it would have to be concluded that sound does not exist because no one
in the community would have sense perceptions of it. And since know-
ledge of reality comes from sense perception, in naive realism, there
can be no reality where there is no sense perception.
Thus, naive realism is inadequate as an epistemological base
from which the theory of Supersanity can view the sources of knowledge.
It is inadequate because sense perception is mutable and, in differing
conditions, allows individuals to perceive in differing ways (Bruner,
1951). It is further inadequate in that sense perception limits man to
apprehension of the finite, of that evident to the sense, and the theory
of Supersanity holds that man can apprehend both finite and non-finite
dimensions and that this apprehension is not limited to sense perception.
The second, traditional view of appearance versus reality is
epistemological idealism. This theory states that "objects or the
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quality of the world in which we perceive by our senses does not exist
independently of a consciousness of them" (Titus, 1959, p. 53). That
is, epistemological idealism feels that there is not external, objective
reality but only a mind which perceives (Sinclair, 1951; Martin, 1957).
The reality of the external world can be neither proven nor disproven
because it can never be directly experienced (Berkeley, 1939).
Again, epistemological idealism is inadequate as a base for the
theory of Supersanity’s view of appearance versus reality. However, it
is difficult to present logical arguments against the position of epis-
temological idealism. However, this is because they position reasons in
a circular way and, if you accept their basic premise, the system is air
tight (Titus, 1959). Nonetheless, it has been repeatedly stated that the
theory of Supersanity holds man capable of finite and non-finite appre-
hension. Epistemological idealism not only holds that there is no real-
ity, but it limits man to the confines of the self. It eliminates the
possibility of any knowledge at all by transforming all experience into
appearance, into an event in the perceiver's subjective consciousness
(Montague, 1925).
The final description of appearance versus reality is objectiv-
ism which is a mid-point between the extremes of naive realism and epis-
temological idealism. Objectivism holds that there is an external re-
ality, but that we do not perceive it directly; we perceive instead,
sense data which results when our senses contact an external object;
and this experience of contact is relayed through mental channels and
transformed into our perception (Russell, 1912). Objectivism does not
deny the reality of either the object or the perceiver. However, it
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does distinguish between perception created with reference to an object
(touch, taste, smell, etc.) and perception created without reference to
an object (memories, dreams, hallucinations, etc.), and states that per-
ception with reference to an object is more real than perception without
reference to an object.
Objectivism, as currently interpreted, is the most adequate of
the three traditional descriptions of appearance and reality. It acknow-
ledges the existence of external and internal realities and considers
both real. Its one deficiency is in giving preference to perception with
reference to an object. The theory of Supersanity accepts objectivism as
an epistemological view of appearance and reality, with the modification
of preference to perception with object. The theory of Supersanity holds
that there are times when perception without object exerts more power
over the individual than perception with object. Consider, for example,
the child who is daydreaming, falls and scrapes his knee, but does not
notice the pain because the dream is more powerful.
With this one modification, objectivism provides a base for
Supersanity's view of appearance and reality. It now states both object
and perceiver are real, and in cases where a decision regarding the re-
ality of a differing perception must be made, preference will be given
to the perception exercising the most power over the individual. Of
course, the perception may be of finite or non-finite dimensions, and
it may not necessarily be in accord with societal norms; but it must
correspond to the teleological purpose of health and wholeness.
This concludes discussion of appearance and reality in
philosophy.
Consideration will now be given to appearance and reality in
psychology.
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Psychological Implications of Appearance and Reality
The question of what is appearance and what is reality has been
an important one for psychology. There have been varying answers, but
on the whole, the answer has been, "Sense perception is real." And sense
perception has been accepted as real even though psychology itself has
demonstrated the mutability of sense perception (Allport and Pettigrew,
1957; Sherif, 1935; Asch, 1956).
Thus, current psychological theories view sense perception as
direct experience of reality in a manner similar to naive realism. Sense
perception is felt to be the basis from which man acquires his knowledge,
even that used in dreams, memories, etc. (Ruch, 1963). And there is a
discrepancy between experimental studies of sense perception and theoret-
ical works on the psychological nature of appearance and reality.
Theoretical works, on the whole, have held to sense perception as
the psychological base from which to determine what is real. In this
category fall the major schools of psychology including both behaviorism
and analytic psychology (Woodworth and Sheehan, 1964). Behaviorism be-
gins with sense perception; that is, it is necessary for there to be a
stimulus to the senses before there can be a response to the stimulus
(Ferster and Skinner, 1964). Analytic psychology begins in the same
place with sense perception. Although Freud postulated the primary
process which does not have reference to the external world, he made
it subject to the operation of the secondary process or reality princi-
ple" which is the ego's sense perceptions of the external world (1911).
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Yet while theoretical works focus on sense perception as the way
to distinguish appearance from reality, experimental psychology is busily
demonstrating the unreliability of sense perception.
Thus, Allport and Pettigrew (1957) demonstrated that perception
of geometrical shapes depends on cultural experience with those shapes.
In a culture where a particular geometrical shape does not occur, per-
ception of that shape in an experimental setting is unlikely. Or Asch
(1956) has shown that perception of length, height, etc. will depend
upon group norms, and that individuals will perceive in accord with
those norms. Or again, Bruner, Postman and Rodrigues (1951) demonstrated
that individuals will judge color based on past experience with varying
shapes so that a lobster claw will be seen as more red when compared with
a lemon even if both are the same hue.
While discussion of psychological experiments demonstrating the
mutability of perception could be carried on indefinitely, these examples
sufficiently demonstrate that fact for this paper. The question of what
is real and what is appearance has not been adequately answered by psy-
chology.
Nonetheless, current views of sane /normal /adaptive behavior and
insane/abnormal/maladaptive behavior function as if the question were
decided in favor of reality being sense perception. Therefore, when
describing another characteristic of the psychosis, hallucination, Kisker
(1964, p. 338) reports: "The hallucination. . . is one of the key symp-
toms of the psychosis. A patient is said to be hallucinated when
he
perceives objects and events without an appropriate external stimulus."
This means that sane/normal /adaptive behavior must occur only
in refer-
ence to appropriate external stimuli. It also means that
these external
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stimuli should be perceived in similar ways among sane/normal/adaptive
individuals. If perception of external stimuli differs too greatly
from the norm, then this also is a sign of insane/abnormal/maladaptive
behavior (Braginsky, Braginsky and Ring, 1969).
Thus, in considering the case of Don Quixote (Cervantes, 1937),
Kisker (1964) sees him as psychotic not because he experienced giants
or armies or catles, etc. without sense perception, but because his
sense perception did not conform to the norm.
The most explicit view, in current psychological theory, of
reality as sense perception is that of Alexander Lowen. In The Betrayal
of the Body (1967, pp. 3-4), Lowen discusses questions related to what
is insane/ abnormal /maladaptive and what is real, and states:
The schizoid disturbance creates a dissociation of the image from
reality. The term "image" refers to symbols as opposed to the
reality of the physical experience . . . . The discrepancy between
image and reality is most clearly seen in the delusional schizo-
phrenics. ... On the other hand, "mental health" refers to the
condition where image and reality coincide. A health person has
an image of himself that agrees with the way his body feels.
What Lowen is, in fact, stating is that mental health or sanity/normal-
ity/adaptivity can only occur when a person's image of himself corres-
ponds to his physical appearance, his sense perceptions. That the very
base on which he judges sane/normal /adaptive behavior is not stable but
instead may vary from individual to individual and from circumstance to
circumstance, does not alter his position. Nor does this alter the po-
sition of the current psychological perspective of appearance and
real-
ity. However, because of the conflicts between theoretical
and experi-
mental psychology, sense perception as a base from which to
judge appear-
ance and reality is not an acceptable position for the
theory of Super-
sanity.
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Appearance and Reality in Relationship
to the Theory of Supersanity
What is appearance and what is reality is a crucial question for
the theory of Supersanity. As discussed above, there are conflicts in
the current psychological view of this question, yet even with conflicts,
current psychological theory applies sense perception as reality to its
views of the sane/normal/adaptive.
There is, however, another view of psychological reality that is
in accord with the theory of Supersanity. This is the view presented by
Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality (1967) . In
this they state (pp. 50-51):
Mans’ experience of himself always hovers in a balance between being
and having a body. . . . This eccentricity of man's experience of
his own body has certain consequences for the analysis of human be-
havior in the material environment and as externalizations of sub-
jective meanings.
Because of mans both being and having a body, Berger and Luckmann reject
the idea of sense perception as the only reality. It may be the reality
of the body but is not necessarily the reality of the being who has a
body. This being so, they feel, that being has the ability to perceive
in ways not directly related to sense perception and is capable of per-
ceiving the reality behind the appearance of sense perception. They
further postulate that external reality as expressed in the social norm
is not necessarily reality at all, but instead a social construction
of
a group or society.
This view reduces the conflicts of other current views of
appear-
ance and reality in psychology. It is also, in accord with
the theory of
Supersanity which will attempt also to present a view of
appearance and
continue the conflict of most current views.reality that will not
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This can be done by adopting an objectivist view of the nature
of knowledge or of appearance versus reality. This view states that
there is reality in both object and perceiver, and that sense percep-
tion in itself is not direct experience of reality because it is inter-
preted by the perceiver, who experiences sense perception as a result
of internal process (Montague, 1925; Russell, 1912).
The theory of Supersanity further states that it is possible to
experience reality both with and without an external object of percep-
tion. Given a decision to be made between what is or is not real, the
decision will depend upon which perception has more power over the in-
dividual, allows for perception of both finite and non-finite dimensions,
and is in accord with the teleology of health and wholeness.
Within Supersane individuals, reality will, thus, be perceived
in accord with the personal myths which guide the individual toward
18
health and no health or wholeness. Supersane individuals, on the
other hand, will act in accord with their myths and their perceptions
of reality despite social norms to the contrary. They will act to
actualize their myths and to create a new reality.
Let us consider again the case of The Countess Aurelia in The
Madwoman of Chaillot (Giradou, 1958). Within the context of prevailing
social norms. The Countess appears to be insane/abnormal/maladapted; she
has all the classic symptoms of psychosis; she hallucinates, has delu-
sions, emotional disturbances, etc. But are her hallucinations, delu-
sions, etc. unreal?
18
Again, refer to the case study in Appendix A for further dis
cussion of this point.
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Her delusions consist of apprehending the world as a place of
kindness, goodness and love. This perspective is based not on sense
perception which might tell her that the finite world is not as she
perceives it. But she is able to see these sense perceptions not as
reality but as an appearance created by social norms. The world is
only greedy
,
insensitive and cruel because the social norm has made it
that way.
Also, The Countess’ delusions exert more force, have more power
in her life than sense perceptions. And finally, her perceptions of the
world as a place of goodness, kindness and love are in accord with the
teleology of health and wholeness. The Countess, by acting on her myth,
is able to create a new reality, a reality where the world good, kind
and loving. This new reality will be able to be verified by sense per-
ception and internal consciousness. Therefore, we must conclude that
The Countess perceives what is reality from the outset.
Yossarian in Catch 22 (Heller, 1970), likewise, would appear as
insane in current views of sanity/ insanity/abnormality and within the
context of prevailing social norms. He too had delusions, emotional
disturbances, etc. But upon examining his delusions, etc., it can be
seen that some were confirmed even by sense perception. This is espe-
cially clear in the case of his delusion that people were trying to
kill him. Everytime he went on a bombing run, his senses confirmed
the fact that people were trying to kill him; he heard the bombs, saw
the flack, smelled the explosives; also, he felt the knife enter his
body when Natley’s whore stabbed him. Thus, was not this delusion
real?
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And what of Yossarian' s myth of the right of the individual to
survive with dignity and respect. This myth exerted greater power in
his life than the societal norms which pressured him into giving up
either his life or his dignity. And, of course, this myth is in accord
with the teleological goal of health and wholeness. Finally, Yossarian
turned this myth into a reality when he chose to have both life and dig-
nity. Thus, we must conclude that Yossarian perceived reality, else he
could not have created it.
Furthermore, these characteristics are also displayed by McMurphy
in One Flew Over the Cuckcoo's Nest (Kesey, 1962). That is, McMurphy
perceived the reality of Big Nurse’s ward despite conflicting sense im-
pressions and social norms. One set of sense perceptions and social
norms indicated that the reality of the ward was helping individuals to
lead productive, individual lives. The other set of sense perceptions
and norms indicated that the reality of the ward was the destruction of
individuals, to make them controllable. Of course, McMurphy was able to
perceive that the latter was the reality—destruction and controllabil-
ity. He was then able to act upon his myth in combatting this. McMurphy
did not believe that individuals were controllable. He felt that "having
a good time" was important. He was able to hold on to this myth despite
social pressure to the contrary , and although he did not succeed in
creating a new reality for himself, he did succeed in doing so for others.
Even though McMurphy was destroyed by the ward, he succeeded in creating
a new reality for others through his myth. With this in mind, must not
his perceptions of reality be considered valid?
Finally, in the case of historical Supersane individuals, these
characteristics can also be seen to operate. In the case of Malcolm
X,
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did he not perceive reality when he said that Black is powerful? It is
true that his sense perceptions would have told him that the myth of
Black Power was only appearance, that the world was a place in which
Blacks were oppressed and powerless. But he did not rely on his sense
perceptions, nor did he conform to societal norms. His perception of
reality was the more powerful and he acted in accord with it and with
the teleology of health and wholeness. For a time, his myth became a
reality for him; and when he died, it was already a reality for others.
Must we not then assume that he perceived reality from the beginning,
and that the social norms and sense perceptions conflicting with his
myth were only appearances?
Of course, hospitalized individuals also have the ability to
distinguish between appearance and reality, and to choose their myth
and perception of reality over the prevailing social norms. The indi-
vidual who believed himself to be a farmer is an excellent example of
this. In a hospital where appearances were aimed at creating an envi-
ronment where individuals felt valued, free to make choices, and on an
equal level with the staff, he perceived another reality. He perceived
that he would be constantly evaluated, seen as less than normal, and
felt to be not capable of making choices for himself. The day that he
was staffed, he greeted the assembled doctors and psychologists with,
"Do I say Hi or Heil?" This remark was construed as confirmation of
his insanity/ abnormality/maladaptivity. But it was a description of
the reality of the staffing procedure— the staff would operate in to-
tolarian ways, making all decisions for him, and allowing him no per-
sonal freedom. He pointed out this reality for everyone present.
He
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was able to do this because his perception of the situation was more
powerful for him than the social norm. Also
,
he was able to do this
because he perceived what was the teleological purpose.
It has, thus, been demonstrated that Supersane individuals have
the ability to distinguish between appearance and reality. This is done
because Supersane individuals do not rely exclusively on sense perception
of the finite to make this distinction. They are able to utilize appre-
hension of teleological wholeness and personal myths to both describe
and create reality. Often, their perceptions are in conflict with pre-
vailing social norms, but their perceptions have more power in their
lives than the social norms and thus they are more able to discard them
and seek the reality behind them.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY OF THE THEORY OF SUPERSANITY
Madmen and lovers have such seethings brains,
Such shapting fantasies, that apprehend
More than cool reason ever comprehends.
The lunitic, the lover, and the poet
Are of imagination all compact.
Shakespeare
Thus far, the prevailing view of sane/normal/adaptive behavior
has been compared with the theory of Supersanity. However, no attempt
has been made to relate the characteristics of Supersane individuals to
each other or to show that Supersanity is a discrete and observable pat-
tern of behavior. This will be the task of this chapter. First, how-
ever, it is necessary to give a brief discussion of the differences be-
tween the theory of Supersanity and the view of sane/normal/adaptive
behavior current in psychology.
Comparison of Supersanity and Current Views of Sanity
There has been extensive discussion of the differences between
current views of sane/normal/adaptive behavior and the theory of Super
sanity. Perhaps the easiest way to summarize these differences is in
terms of a chart. The following chart capsulizes these differences in
terms of seven major points of contention.
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Present Psychological
Descriptions of Sanity
epistemological
logic as the basis for problem
solving
Apollonian
individuality as a sign of men-
tal health
adherence to form and a golden
mean
free from delusions
reality as correspondence with
sense perception
The Theory of Supersanity
ontological, teleological and
epistemological
reason as the basis for problem
solving
Dionysian
awareness of being part of a
larger order than just the self
creation of intense emotional
experience
possesses personal myths
able to distinguish between appear-
ance and reality by not relying ex-
clusively on sense perception
These seven points include major points of conflict between current
descriptions of sane/normal/adaptive behavior and the theory of Super-
sanity. However, since justification for diverging from the accepted
points of view was given above, it will not be repeated here. The chart
should be sufficient to refresh the reader, and also to present an over-
view of the differences between the way in which sanity is currently
described and the alternative being presented here.
The Relationship Between the Various
Characteristics of Supersanity
Five characteristics of Supersane behavior have been, thus far,
discussed. They are:
1. The ability to integrate reason and emotion in solving
problems.
2. Dionysian action within a framework of commitment and
responsi-
bility.
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3. The possession of personal myths.
4. The ability to distinguish between appearance and reality.
5. Action in accord with a positive teleology despite societal
disapproval.
The Philosophical Foundation of Supersanity
These five characteristics of Supersane behavior must, first, be
considered within the philosophical foundation of the theory of Super-
sanity. This foundation began on an ontological level, and it stated
that man was a rational being, possessing both finite and non-finite
dimensions (Clay, 1947; Cassirer, 1953). It also stated that man was
both part of and superior to the natural order (Neibuhr, 1941), and
able to use his reason to interpret both finite and non-finite dimen-
sions of reality or experience.
An epistemological base for the theory of Supersanity was next
presented. This stated that the sources of knowledge available to men
include sense perception, thinking processes, unconscious mental pro-
cesses, and intuition (Montague, 1925). The nature of knowledge, or
of appearance and reality, was also considered and an objectivist po-
sition adopted. This stated that both object and perceiver are real,
but that sense perception is not direct experience of reality because
these perceptions are transformed by consciousness (Russell, 1912).
Also, it was stated that reality is that perception which has the most
power in an individual's life and is in accord with the teleology
of
wholeness (Rogers, 1961). Finally, the question of the validity of
The traditional tests of truth—correspondence,knowledge was discussed.
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consistency and pragmatic—were seen, in themselves, as inadequate; and
they were, instead, melded into a composite view which states that truth
is that which corresponds to finite and non-finite reality, is consis-
tent with individual patterns of belief and commitment, and aides in
both the biological and spiritual struggle for survival (Murphy, 1943).
Finally, truth is also that which corresponds to the teleological purpose
of health and wholeness.
The characteristics of Supersane behavior must be understood
within the context of this philosophical framework. Once this is done,
it is possible to consider them singly and together.
Supersanity and Dionysianism
The postulate that Supersane behavior occurs within a Dionysian
orientation but with commitment and responsibility is, perhaps, the most
sweeping concept of the theory of Supersanity. A Dionysian orientation
means that the Supersane individual is aware of the divine or non-finite
within himself, in the external world and in others (Dodds, 1971). It
allows him to be integrated within himself and with the universe as a
whole (Maslow, in Anderson, 1958; Neitzsche, 1956). It also allows him
to utilize the power within himself and in others (Brown, 1959). A
Dionysian orientation allows man to act in accord with the teleological
purpose of health and wholeness because it places man with, and makes
him an integral part of, the universal direction toward health and
wholeness (Brown, 1959). It also gives the Supersane individual
direct
access to intense emotional experience which allows him to
contact both
the power and purpose of the universe (Neitzsche, 1956;
Kaufman, 1956).
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Supersanity and Reality
The theory of Supersanity also postulates that Supersane indi-
viduals have the ability to distinguish between appearance and reality.
This means that Supersane individuals will recognize the reality of both
object and perceiver, but will not depend exclusively on sense percep-
tion for this (Russell, 1912). It also means that their perceptions
of reality will have more power in their lives than the social norm.
Their perceptions of reality will also be in accord with the teleology
of wholeness.
Supersanity and Personal Myth
Another characteristic of the Supersane individual is the pos-
session of personal myths. This implies that the Supersane individual
has not accepted others’ definitions of him but has, instead, developed
a personal myth of who he is. This myth allows the Supersane individual
to have a base from which to act in the present and a goal toward which
to go in the future (Jung, 1938). The action on personal myth in the
present seems to allow the Supersane individual to create the reality
of the future, a reality in accord with the teleology of wholeness.
Supersanity and Reason Integrated With Emotion
The theory of Supersanity also states that Supersane individuals
seem able to use all the varied mental processes at their disposal.
They are able to call into play both conscious and unconscious mental
process and to use these with their emotions in problem-solving
(Cassirer, 1953). Also, Supersane individuals are able to apprehend
both finite and non-finite dimensions of experience (Matthews, 1936)
and to use this apprehension in problem-solving.
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Supersanity and Action in Accord
With Positive Teleology
The final characteristic of the Supersane individual is the
ability to act consistently with a positive teleology despite societal
disapproval. This implies that the Supersane individual is able to
perceive the positive teleology and to act in accord with it despite
social norms and pressure to conform to them when these norms are con-
trary to the positive teleology. This seems to be so because the Super-
sane individual perceives reality and this perception of reality is more
powerful for him than societal pressure.
This concludes discussion of the characteristics of Supersane
behavior. It is time to consider if this is, in fact, an observable
and discrete pattern of behavior.
Supersanity as an Observable Pattern of Behavior
The question of whether or not Supersanity is an observable and
discrete pattern of behavior is, of course, a crucial one. If it is
not a discrete pattern of behavior, then it is not an alternative to
the present sanity-insanity dichotomy. It is, instead, a description
of one or the other.
However, the characteristics of Supersane individuals have been
shown to be consistent at least in those literary or historical
individ-
uals considered. There is also a sense that there is something
different
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in the behavior of these individuals than that what is currently labelled
as sane or insane.
Unfortunately, the only conclusive evidence, other than that
presented here, would be research on the characteristics of Supersanity
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
CHAPTER VI
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE THEORY OF SUPERSANITY
Since brevity is the soul of wit
I will be brief.
Shakespeare
There are, of course, numerous implications for education posed
by the theory of Supersanity. The most obvious is for education to
have a clearly defined philosophical base from which to describe human
behavior and learning. This means that education must develop a clear-
ly defined ontological and teleological perspective in addition to the
epistemological perspective which it already possesses (Plato, 1942;
Descartes, 1927).
The theory of Supersanity also implies that education must be-
gin to view human behavior in terms different from those implied by
social norms. It has been shown that social norms are arbitrary and
do not necessarily reflect innate behavior (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959).
They are, in fact, social constructions which vary from society to so-
ciety and from group to group (Benedict, 1934a; Berger and Luckmann;
1967). To force individuals to conform to the norms of a dominant group
does disservice to both teacher and student.
Also, the theory of Supersanity implicitly states that the
natural course of human development is toward health and wholeness
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(Rogers, 1961). This implies a certain integrity and directedness in
human behavior which education seems to disregard in its insistence on
basic skills and required course, and the like.
Perhaps the most important implication of the theory of Super-
sanity for education and counseling is the necessity to stop defining
others and let them develop personal myths as to who they are and will
be. It is common practice for both education and counseling to decide
what is correct for an individual. The therapist decides what is healthy
behavior, and the teacher decides what individuals will be when they
grow up. However, one need only consider the case study in the Appendix
to see the damage done by this type of definition.
Because personal myths give an individual a goal toward which
to strive (Jung, 1938), they also allow him to create new realities for
himself. This is important to both—in education where there are prob-
lems with achievement and motivation because students are defined by
others, and to counseling where there is difficulty in producing any
change at all in sick individuals (Kisker, 1964). If both education
and counseling worked on the development of personal myths, individuals
would be more apt to be motivated by their own goals.
Also, development of personal myths could become a new thera-
peutic technique for those who have let others define them and are con-
sequently without goals. This therapeutic technique would begin with
the discarding of the definitions of the individual developed by others.
As demonstrated in the case study in the Appendix, this is a difficult
therapeutic process and must bring to bear all the skill of a therapist
without his developing new definitions for the client. Within the
therapeutic technique of developing personal myths, the therapist
would
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be allowed to regard the individual as capable of developing personal
myths and expecting him to become a whole and healthy individual. Be-
yond this, his expectations of and his demands on the client should not
interfere with the development of personal myths by the client.
The therapists' function in this instance would be to guide the
client through the phases of sign, symbol and myth outlined by Sebba
(1962) as the process of mythopoeia. Unfortunately, this process can
not be easily demonstrated. It is partially begun in the case study in
the Appendix. Events such as Sam's taking of cigarettes without apology
become signs of his growing independence. Unfortunately, this particular
therapeutic process ended before these signs could be turned into symbols
and from there, into myths. However, the theory of Supersanity implies
that this is possible. Exploration of this particular aspect of the
theory would be valuable.
The theory of Supersanity also suggests that both education and
counseling should stop enforcing adherence to the Apollonian mean of
emotional expression and allow individuals to express their emotions in
the moment of their experience. This would put individuals in touch
with realities outside of themselves as seen in discussion of Dionysian
contact with the non-finite through intense emotional experience (Benedict,
1934b). It would also eliminate much repression current in the classroom
and counseling center and put individuals more in touch with themselves
and with each other. Such an occurence could only be beneficial to the
classroom and the counseling center.
Finally, the theory of Supersanity implies that research is nec-
essary to conclusively identify the pattern of behaviors that the theory
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postulates. This research should begin with each of the sub-patterns
of behavior discussed within the theory. These are: integration of
reason and emotions, Dionysian action within a framework of commitment
and responsibility, possession of personal myths, ability to distinguish
between appearance and reality, and action in accord with a positive
teleology despite societal disapproval. Each sub-pattern of the theory
of Supersanity should be studied to determine if it is an extant pattern
of behaviors or if it occurs only in combination with the other sub-
patterns. If found to occur only in combination or if the five sub-
patterns are found to occur together in an observable pattern of behavior,
then this pattern may be labelled Supersanity and its existence given ex-
perimental validity.
It would also be important to begin research on the cultural
implications of the theory. It may be, for example, that particular
cultures or sub-cultures display the behavior characteristic of the Super-
sane more frequently than members of other cultures. If this is so, it
would be important to analyze these cultures in terms of their psychology,
philosophy and economics to see what can be learned.
Again, it would be important to research or observe individuals
who possess the characteristics of the Supersane. What is their impact
on the society in which they live? Do they transmit Supersane behavior
to those around them, e.g. their children, their wives? Is it possible
for them to be integrated into their societies or sub-groups? Are they
usually "marginal" men at best only on the societal fringes?
There are other important questions raised by the theory of
Supersanity. For example, how do you identify the Supersane individual
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when he is not involved in a conflict situation? Thus far, each Super-
sane individual discussed in presenting the theory of Supersanity has
been involved in a definite conflict situation. This was true of
Malcolm X, Jesus, Yossarian, Countess Aurelia, Frodo, Gandalf, and the
hospitalized farmer. Does Supersanity exist in non-conflict situations?
Also, if it is agreed that Supersanity is a desirable pattern of
behavior, can it be developed in the way sanity is now? Or because it
includes the ability to act outside of prevailing social norms, are
social norms ineffectual in developing it? In fact, does Supersanity
occur by accident?
This is, of course, only a brief discussion of the possible areas
in which there are research possibilities for the theory of Supersanity.
Most crucial to answer quickly are: Does it exist? Is it a better way
to act? What does it imply for society? Once these questions are an-
swered, the others will become only a matter of time.
Of course, answering all of these questions is beyond the scope
of this paper which was designed to make initial presentation of the
theory of Supersanity. However, because there is only, at present, a
/
postulation of a pattern of behavior without experimental validation
does not mean that the theory of Supersanity is unusable. It does pro-
vide an alternative to the present sanity-insanity dichotomy. As an
alternative, it can provide new perspective from which to observe human
behavior and it can also provide new guidelines from which to judge
human behavior. But, in its present form, it does not force or require
the individual to agree with these perspectives or guidelines. Instead,
it allows the individual to choose which of the descriptions is most in
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accord with his beliefs. This ability to choose is totally consistent
with the Theory of Supersanity.
/
APPENDIX
Case Study from Position Paper
The following outline of the eleven meetings Sam and I shared
is taken from my notes on the audiotape recordings of these meetings.
The typescript is taken verbatim from the last meeting.
Session 1 : I did not read Sam's case history before the initial inter-
view. I wanted to respond to him as a person I was meeting
for the first time instead of attempting to understand him
as a patient being seen for the initial interview.
The encounter began with introductions and an explanation of
who I was. Sam followed with a half hour or so monologue
about his various physical ailments. "If I had the money,
I'd go to the Mayo Clinic and get the right operation or
pills."
I listened because I had observed Sam at a ward meeting. He
orated to the empty space in the center of the group. No
one listened.
My first interruption of the monologue was to say that I
was having difficulty understanding him. Could he talk
slower. He tried. Then said he couldn't. We shared a
relaxation exercise and then Sam decided to go. I asked
if he would like to talk again. He said yes.
Session 2 : Sam started talking about his "symptoms of epilepsy" without
even greeting me. I interrupted and told him I found it hard
to care about what he was saying when he didn't acknowledge
that I was there.
Sam talked about my clothes for a bit and then returned to
his discourse on his epilepsy. I got pissed. He got upset.
I apologized. He talked on. I got pissed. He got upset
and left. I felt guilty.
Session 3: Sam remembered last week's argument. He greeted me before
talking about being retarded. I got pissed. He stopped.
We talked about what was happening. "I'm a hopeless case.
X ' 11 get you upset." "I'm a person. When you act like
I'm not here, I get hurt."
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Session 4:
Session 5
Session 6
Session 7
Sam talked about school, his learning problems, his mother,
the teacher. He blamed everyone else for his problems but’himself. He also used what his mother said about him asjustification for the way he felt about himself. I out-
lawed talk about the past. We sat in silence for ages until
Sam asked for a cigarette. He told me he liked me when he
left. I liked him too.
Sam brought me a drawing to pay for the cigarette he borrowed.
I asked him for a story about the drawing. He talked about a
car ride but left out the good part" so I wouldn’t be upset.
I told him I had parked in cars before so what was the sur-
prise. Sam has prostrate trouble and can’t have an erection.
I was surprised!
Sam s brothers have children. They have been to college. He
is retarded but it isn't his fault. I called bullshit here
for the first time. No more talk about the past if it's go-
ing to be bullshit. Sam said he thought he was going to have
a seizure. I said I didn't have a stick but would take out
my wallet to use just in case. He left to get water.
Sam started with the bullshit again. I said I wouldn't listen.
He had a fit (literally) . I went to get coffee because I told
him, "I'd rather have coffee than watch you. Will ten minutes
be enough? I'll be back then."
Sam was sitting up when I got back. He wanted to know if he
had to go to his room now. No, I said, did he want coffee.
Yes, he did. We left for the canteen.
Sam talked about how other people reacted to his seizures.
He wasn't responsible because he was "prenatal." I didn't
know what prenatal meant. Sam's explanation was that pre-
natal was what your parents do to make babies. He wasn't
to blame.
No one asks to be bom. But we are so why not make the best
of it? Sam tries to make more excuses, says he is a hopeless
case. I ask if that is what he wants to be. No, it isn't.
We spent the next ten or fifteen minutes saying "I don't
want to be a hopeless case. I won't be a hopeless case, I
am not a hopeless case." Sam announced these facts to the
doctor as he left.
: Sam has been using the communications skills learned in the
group. He evidently has been calling his mother everyday
for the past week asking to go home. She thinks he under-
stands better if he sees her answer in writing. Sam brought
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her answer for me to read. He can't come home; she is too
old to have to look after him; by the way, dear Sam, I have
to end now so I can take Mrs. to the wist party in
Xville (only sixty miles away).
Sam talks about his mother for a while, trying to put his
words into here and now feelings. All he can remember is
the bad things she told him. He believes them. He hates
her.
Sam gives himself some Gestalt appreciation. It's hard for
him not to say I like myself because.
. . but. ... We try
to make a list, put it in writing, of all the good things
about Sam. Sam doesn't want to believe what I have to say
that s nice so we ask the staff for one good thing about Sam.
If it s something on the list already, we get another so
that every response is something different. Sam put the
list in the envelope with his mother's letter when he left.
Session 8 : Sam says he is nervous about being President of the ward.
The guys call him that when he talks to no one in particular.
We talk about why he does this. He is afraid to ask for
attention, afraid people will ignore him. So he gets it
over with first.
Sam gets his list at my request. He reads it aloud. He
picked three good things about himself to think about when
he got nervous.
He talked about being nervous in school. He wasn't to blame
but he had seizures when he got nervous. Lucky coincidence.
Sam felt a seizure coming on. I thought he was putting me
on. We laughed all the way to the canteen.
Session 9 : I tell Sam that I have to leave in two weeks. He says he
knew I would get upset. He goes back to being a hopeless
case again. We play the "Oh you're not" game. ... We
talk about what's happening. Sam has two defenses: seizures
and being a hopeless case. One or the other usually works.
I ask if he doesn't want to be a hopeless case, what does
he want to be. There is no positive response; all Sam can
say is what he would like to be if this or that problem
didn't get in the way. This is what Sam's mother used to
tell him.
Session 10: Sam says he wants to go to a back ward. He has learned a
new defense. No, it's a variation of the hopeless case
routine. We sing "I'm a hopeless case" to I've Been Working
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on the Railroad. Another patient joins our song from out-
side the office. Sam is indignant. He gets up and tells
the person he is not a hopeless case.
Why will Sam let people close to him say things about him
he doesn’t like when he won’t let a stranger? If Sam lets
people near him say he is sick, or dumb, or epileptic, then
they have to be responsible for him.
Session 11: Sam: You’d better not waste your time with me, dear. Bet-
ter find someone more interesting. I should be sent
to 7. Will you ask the doctor for me?
Me: What are you asking for, Sam? Do you want me to say
I’m not wasting time with you?
Sam: (reaching for my pack of cigarettes) Can I have one
until payday.
. . tomorrow? ... I shouldn't take
these from you. I belong on a back ward. They elected
me president here but no one listens to me. (He starts
to cry and continues talking for several minutes. I
can't make out what he is saying.)
Me: I want to listen but can’t understand what you’re say-
ing. Do you want me to listen? ... He nods.
. .
okay then. Take a deep breath. Relax. .
.
pause
while he does this, lights a cigarette and stops cry-
ing. . . . What do you want to tell me?
Sam: I have no comprehension in reading. Don't remember
names. They won't let me talk in the meeting unless
I know the names. I have seizures and can't be presi-
dent. Oh. . . it's too bad. You don't want me around,
dear. Better send me to seven.
Me: Why do you want to go to seven? Will it be easier to
remember names there?
Sam: Strict medical supervision. The nurses notice when I
have seizures. I can't remember to write them down.
It's not my fault one single bit.
Me: Back to the bullshit again. Now you're wasting my
time.
Sam: But I had a seizure and can't be president. It's not
my fault. I should be on a back ward.
Me: You had a seizure this morning. No one was paying at-
tention to you because what you were saying had noth-
ing to do with what Wes was talking about. Terry told
you to shut up and. . .
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Sam: But it's not my fault one single bit. I got. . .
Me: I know. . . "symptoms of epilepsy."
Sam: That's right and. . .
Me: and you managed to have seizures at the right times.
You. .
.
(pause). . . Sam, do you know what's happen-
ing? I'm arguing with you to make you agree with me.
And. . .ah. .
.
you're enjoying it, telling me more
bullshit. . . waiting to see me get upset.
Sam: (grins) You'd better find someone else dear. It's no
use. . . I can't help it. Ask my mother. .
.
gives
her name and address. . . she can tell you all about
it.
Me: Do you know what I think? I think you're either
treating me the way your mother treats you or doing. .
the way you get her upset. Which is it?
Sam: When I was bad, my mother always sent me to my room.
"Go to your room, Sam; company is coming." My brothers
got to stay and. . . and have interesting conversations
They are talkers, had comprehension in reading. But
I'm a hopeless case.
Me: Are you being bad now? Is that why you want to go to
your room?
Sam: Go to my room?
Me: Sure, a back ward. . . seven. . . where you can be
away from people. No one will get upset. . . or em-
barrassed if you have seizures.
Sam: And the nurses give strict medical supervision. Make
sure you get the medicines. And all the patients are
. . .
crazy and. . . (sigh). . . It's for the best my
dear.
Me: (get up and go and crouch in a corner) Yes mother,
you know best. After all, I have symptoms of epilep-
sy and don't remember peoples' names. I haven't got
comprehension and reading. And can't do anything you
want me to
.
Sam: That's right. When I was home the last time, I was
carrying groceries on my bike. I had a seizure and
. . it was right on the six lane highway. The bags
went all over the road. The ambulance took me to the
Hospital and called mother.
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Me: And she was embarrassed because everyone knew about
the seizure. I had to go to my room as soon as I
got back from the hospital.
Sam: And they forgot about supper because she had to go
to Mrs. 's bridge game.
Me: And I was alone in my room, and afraid. . . and hun-
gry. . . didn't anybody care?
Sam: She's a good woman. It's for the best. The priest
asked me not to come to mass.
Me: (standing up) Even God didn't care. But I'm Sam Jones
and I'm a person. I don't have to go to my room just
because my mother wants me to. People who like me
want me around even if I'm sick. . . even if I embar-
rass them.
Even if I have seizures. I'm a person. I don't have
to go to my room because I'm Sam. I'm a person.
Sam: I don't have to go to my room?. .
.
(sigh). . . I don't
have to. I'm not a hopeless case. My mother can't
send me there.
Me: No, she can't. She's not here unless you want her to
be. . . unless you act like her. . . tell yourself to
go to your room.
Sam: Don't want her here. I want to. . . (pause). . .
Me: What do you want to do with your mother?
Sam: Beat her. . . (pause). . . and other things.
Me: Beat her and other things? At the same time?
Sam: Yes, she's been screwing me for a long time.
Me: Could a seventy-year-old woman take it?
Sam: No.
Me: Well?
Sam: She did it to me.
And you couldn't take it. You got sick and she blamed
you for being sick. Pretty soon you even blamed your-
self. Are you still blaming yourself?
Me:
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Sam: I don't have to go to my room. Can I have another
cigarette?
Me: Sure. That's what they're there for, for you to help
yourself.
Sam: God helps those who help themselves.
Me: Well, we all have to help ourselves.
Sam: That's hard; besides, I.
.
.
(pause). . . I, I. . .
it's hard. I can't go away. I'll stay here.
Me: Yes, it's hard to help yourself. You have to stay
here and try while I have to go and try at school.
But we can both do it.
Sam: Even without comprehension and reading.
Me: Yup, even without comprehension and reading.
Sam: I'm taking some cigarettes for this afternoon.
Rather than go into detailed analogies between my view of myth,
appearance and reality and what happened between Sam and me I will draw
a few conclusions and save the rest for the exam.
Sam had no myth, no structure for his reality. He took the sys-
tem of appearances set up for him by his mother and brothers. This
appearance became so real to him that it was all he could see.
When confronted by reality, Sam had to retreat to appearances.
Both his seizures and his "hopeless caseness" were put-ons, pure appear-
ance. These appearances kept Sam from being responsible, from having a
goal toward which to strive. These appearances also gave Sam an
easy
way out, made being possible.
I blew it with Sam because I succeeded in making him aware
of
the futility of his appearance-actions but never
succeeded in helping
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him develop a myth which would allow him to deal with the threatening,
frightening nature of reality. Sam appears to progress, to "get it to-
gether." But he is no better off because he was shown the way out of
the cave when for him, the door was barred. We shouldn't have to learn
from our mistakes when the mistakes are people.
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